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A large number of nation states throughout the globe entered into regional trade agreements (RTAs) during the 1980s and 1990s. Most observers assumed that the majority of RTAs could be understood as expressions of a single phenomenon: a widespread embrace of free trade. Uninterested in comparative questions, they made the collective turn to integration the subject of their analyses. This articleThis paper challenges this undifferentiated view of RTAs. In so doing, it produces evidence that directly speaks to current debates on globalization, the nature of markets, and the spread of neoliberalism across the world. The starting premise is that regional market building is a social endeavor, occurring in the midst of thick institutional contexts. Those contexts give rise to RTAs with remarkably different characteristics. The empirical analysis focuses on the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and Mercosur. Attention is given to the divergent evolution of law and organizations in three spheres of social life: working women, dairy products, and labor rights. The concluding section discusses additional variables shaping RTAs and venues for future research.   





The closing of the twentieth century and the opening of the twenty-first witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). As Europe pushed for the completion of its regional market, a stunning number of countries in North America, South America, Africa, and Asia rushed to form their own regional markets. Numerous academics, journalists, and other observers responded to these events. Most, however, assumed that the majority of RTAs could be understood as expressions of a single phenomenon: a widespread embrace of free trade and the ideology of capitalism. Uninterested in comparative questions, they then made the collective turn to integration their subject of analysis.  This articleThis paper challenges this undifferentiated view of RTAs. In so doing, it undermines notions of a global world where the ‘local’ has lost its relevance, confirms the insights of economic sociologists about the constructed nature of markets, and contributes to recent works on the uneven spread of neoliberalism across geographies. 
The starting premise of the article is that regional market building is a social endeavor, occurring in the midst of rich institutional contexts. Those contexts both guide and limit what is possible, providing much continuity between the shape of RTAs and realities on the ground, and giving each RTA a very particular profile. The article focuses on two dimensions of difference across RTAs: the legal architecture of RTAs and the response of major societal organizations to integration. 




The empirical analysis concerns the three most important RTAs in existence: the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and South America’s Mercosur. EThe EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur, then, have developed quite different legal and organizational landscapes. Evidence from three areas of social life ---- 
Evidence for these claims comes from three areas of social life: working women, dairy products, and labor rights  ---– illustratess the extent of those differences across those three RTAs. Only EU officials have generated complex laws on working women. Only Mercosur officials have standardized the world of dairy products. In all three RTAs, officials have generated important principles surrounding labor rights; yet, their definitions and visions vary significantly. Organizational changes have paralleled these legal developments. Regional-level women’s groups have developed only in the EU. In Mercosur alone have dairy companies rushed to expand their operations across borders. In all three RTAs, national administrations have developed units with regional structures and programs in the area of labor rights; crucially, however, the nature of those structures and programs varies across RTAs. This articleThis paper explores in detail these differences. The concluding section discusses the importance of culture and rationality in shaping RTAs and venues for future research.

THE TURN TO INTEGRATION
Between 1990 and 1994, officials from the World Trade Organization (WTO) were notified of 33 new RTAs. This doubled the total to 68 (Frankel 1997: 4; International Monetary Fund 1994). Then, between 1995 and 2001 another 100 RTAs formed. A patchwork of regional agreements covered much of the world. As one observer wrote, RTAs have become “almost a craze in the sedate world of economics, springing up here, there and everywhere” (Urata 2002, p. 21). The most prominent examples included NAFTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Area in Southeast Asia, the South African Development Community Protocol on Trade, South America’s Mercosur, and a rejuvenated EU.
All of these RTAs shared a similar broad objective: establishing spaces where some or all (depending on the RTA) trade can take place free from tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Trade refers to the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across national borders. Tariff barriers refer to taxes imposed on the movement of whatever is being exchanged. Non-tariff barriers include quotas, subsidies, fiscal incentives, and other forms of support used by national governments to help certain industries or players. More subtle forms include disparate regulatory regimes and inarticulate expectations that market participants might hold about the world, such as expectations about all aspects of a visit to a grocery store, the characteristics of wheat beer, or the equipment available at a ski resort. 
But for a few exceptions concerned with the broad objectives and design of RTAs (Atksinon 1999; Mansfield and Milner 1997; Milner 1997; Grieco 1997), observers reacted to the wave of regional integration in the 1980s and 1990s by assuming RTAs to be essentially similar attempts to liberalize trade among neighboring countries. Largely uninterested in comparative questions, they proceeded to make the widespread turn to regional integration the subject of their analysis. Three lines of analysis became especially popular.
First, observers asked why so many countries felt compelled, in the space of a few years, to enter into such trade agreements. The focus was on the collective turn to regional integration. What factors could explain this general embrace of regional free trade? The key questions, applied in blanket fashion to all RTAs, became “why the change, and why now?” (Frankel 1997, p. 4). Economic explanations for the explosion of RTAs were the most popular. Scholars pointed to the growing ineffectiveness of the GATTGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, later, the World Trade Organizationthe WTO, in dealing with trade issues (Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr 1999, p. 4; Hormats 1994, p. 99; Bergsten 1996, p. 106). They added that the collapse of Communism and the failure of import substitution experiments in Latin America made the benefits of free trade all the more clear (Gibb 1994, p. 6; Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr 1999, p. 5; Hormats 1994, p.101). They then suggested that RTAs were ‘supplying’ the institutional structures demanded by the steep increases in trade across nations (Jayasuriya 2003, p. 200; Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr 1999, p. 11; Stubbs 2000). 
Political and sociological explanations for the proliferation of RTAs were quickly developed to complement economic accounts. For some, RTAs were mostly the creation of political leaders everywhere eager to remain in power (Milner 1998, p. 20; Mattli 1999; Moravcisk 1998). Geopolitical considerations also played an important role: RTAs helped stabilize countries that had just emerged from dictatorial or communist regimes. (Milward 1992; McConnell and PacPherson 1994, p. 170). RTAs offered, as well, advantages for bargaining with powerful third parties, such as the United States, or even  or even otherother RTAs  s (McConnell and MacPherson 1994:, p.167; Mattli 1999: p. 166). Sociological accounts focused more on the rise of a new culture of cosmopolitanism, openness, and progress (Higgott 1998, p. 42; Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basañez, 1996). Emulation also seemed quite important. The successes of the EU in the late 1980s instigated changes in North America. Officials in South America, Asia, and elsewhere, eager to demonstrate both an understanding of world events and their progressive attitudes, mobilized quickly with plans of their own (Baldwin 1997, p. 884; Hormats 1994, p. 101). RTAs spread rapidly, fueled by a ‘domino effect’ (Baldwin 1997, p. 871) driven by legitimacy and a quest for prestige (Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr 1999, p. 20).
A second set of studies turned their focus away from the causes of integration and towards the impact of so many RTAs on the global economy. The critical question was whether “regional arrangements” as a whole should be seen as “stumbling blocks or building blocks for a more integrated and successful economy” (Lawrence 1996, p. 2; Krueger 1999; Kerremans and Switky 2000; De Melo and Panagariya 1993). Could RTAs coexist with a global economic system, or would RTAs “supplant the WTO?” (Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr 1999, p. 27).
Cogent arguments concerning the destructive impact of RTAs on the world economy were quickly produced (Bhawgati and Krueger 1995).  For many, RTAs represented islands of protectionism, designed to protect “less-competitive or inefficient domestic industries from the rigours of wide open global competition” (Yeung, Perdikis, and Kerr 1999, p. 19; Michalak 1994, p. 64). Pundits pointed to a long list of discriminatory measures, such as voluntary export restraint agreements, dumping, subsidies, and complex regulatory regimes (Frankel 1997, p. 212; Hormats 1994, p. 103). “These agreements,” thus wrote Henderson, “are . . . discriminatory . . . and can be viewed as a factor making for disintegration, rather than integration, within the world economy as a whole” (1992, p. 644; Thurow 1992, p. 644). Others pointed to ‘trade diversion’: the inevitable increase in regional trade at the expense of trade formerly conducted with third countries (Krueger 1999, p. 107; Gordon 2003; Frankel 1997, p. 14, 215). Yet others stressed how regional integration diverted energies away from multilateral efforts (Bhagwati 1993; Frankel 1997).
These pessimistic arguments about the incompatibility of RTAs with the global economic system were opposed by a vocal group of economists and others (Kono 2002; Panagariya 2000; Henderson 1992, p. 664). They argued that trade blocs were in fact increasing trade across regions (Krueger 1999, p. 118; Frankel 997, p. 209-210; Salinas 1995, p. 38; Reuveny and Thomson 2000, p. 5). Moreover, they viewed RTAs as ‘building blocks’, ‘stepping-stones’, or even ‘apprenticeships’ towards the formation of a global economy (Summers 1991; Thapanachai: 1999; Gordon 2003, p. 112). RTAs were serving as a “useful laboratory for new approaches to deeper integration which can be applied multilaterally” (Cable 1994; Teague 2003, p. 338).
A third set of scholars investigated the impact of the general embrace of free trade on welfare, understood to include employment, environmental degradation, inequality, and other matters. The resulting analyses tended to be for the most part negative. NAFTA in particular caused much concern (Cavanagh and Anderson 2002), especially with regard to job losses in the United States and Canada (McConnel and MacPherson 1994, p. 175; Griswold 2003, p. 22; MacDonald 2003, pp. 176-179), with some finding negative effects even for Mexico (Ramirez 2003: 863). NAFTA attracted also the ire of environmentalists, who charged that it lacked sufficient environmental provisions (The Ecologist 2002, p. 16; Cavanagh and Anderson 2002, p. 59) and was thus triggering ‘race to the bottom’ in regulation (Reuveny and Thompson 2000, p. 64; McConnell and MacPherson 1994, p. 177). Mercosur and the EU generated significant concerns as well. The former seemed to perpetuate social economic inequalities within the member states, and destined Argentina and Brazil to remain “under-developed” nations unable to achieve genuine macroeconomic growth (Mecham 2003, p. 378), either because of their participation in a exploitative world system or their isolation from it (Richards 1999, p. 133; Connolly 1999). Environmentalists in turn accused Mercosur officials of dealing with environmental matters only as obstacles for the completion of a single market  (Hochstetler 2003, pp. 12-16). The EU, too, worried environmentalists (Skjaerseth and Wettestad 2002; McCormick 2001) but also those concerned with matters of national sovereignty, the evolution of national administrations, civic and popular representation, public health, and much more.​[2]​ Of course, not all agreed with this barrage of criticisms against RTAs. Many scholars and politicians called for a more balanced perspective (Krugman 1993, p. 14; Serra and Espinosa 2002; Malaysia General News 2002), while others simply praised the virtues of integration (Blum 2000; McCormick 2001; Griswold 2003). 
All of these studies  advancedproduced valuable insights intointo the t significantly our understanding of the turn to regional integration in the last decades of the twentieth century. Yet, they also all suffered fromshared a tendency to view all RTAs as fundamentally similar projects. one limitation: a A comparative anal disinterest in comparativeysis analysis. Comparative analyses, however, are very much needed: they ca of RTAs is therefore needed: n shed much light on it can shed much light on the nature of RTAs and, in the process,the nature of RTAs generate findings of relevance, with important implications for our understanding of three topics of current debate: globalization, market building, and the spread of neoliberalism across geographies. 

THE ARGUMENT
This section puts forth two claims about variation across RTAs. The first claim concerns regional law. All market activity depends on participants sharing certain basic views about the world.​[3]​ We may call these views definitional and normative. On the definitional front, market participants must agree on the basic characteristics of many aspects of the world (Zuniga 1999). These include the products being exchanged (e.g. what an apple or a television are), the services being offered (e.g. what property insurance or a legal consultation entail), and the actors involved in transactions (e.g. what a doctor or a teacher are). On the normative side, market participants must agree on an ideal vision of the world, at least in those areas directly or indirectly related to economic activity. Those areas include the terms of exchanges and the desirability of certain practices, behaviors, situations, procedures, conditions, and so on.
Faced with the task of uniting populations from different cultures, planners of many RTA plannerss have chosen to articulate those definitional and normative notions publicly and formally through law.​[4]​ A cursory review of the laws of the EU, Mercosur, NAFTA, and Mercosur and other regional trading blocs indicates the presence of hundreds of definitional and normative notions affecting agricultural goods, industrial goods, financial and other services, professional roles, and much more (Duina 2004; Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). Yet, while in pursuit of similar integrationist objectives, RTA officials have produced legal systems with fundamentally different definitional and normative principles. Those principles are different in two respects: their targets and content. In one RTA, for instance, there may be laws on advertising (i.e., what ‘advertising’ is and how it should be conducted) but not on beer (i.e., what ’ale beer’ is and how it should be labeled). The opposite may be true for a second RTA. If planners in two RTAs target the identical subject matter, the actual content of their definitional and normative principles may vary. Hence, a ‘retiree’ in one RTA may be someone of at least 60 years of age while, in a second, the figure might be 55. Laws in the two RTAs may then endow those retirees with remarkably different healthcare rights. 
The second claim concerns the responses of societal organizations to regional integration. Many interest groups, businesses, and state administrative units have responded to integration by expanding their structures and programs at the regional level. Yet, which groups, businesses, and units have done so varies across RTAs.ed In one RTA, for example, we may observe the rise of environmental groups with transnational membership bases and objectives. In the same RTA, we may also observe that computer manufacturers have expanded their production infrastructures across national borders, while state labor departments participate in new regional-level coordinating bodies and have developed specialized domestic units to deal with the movement of medical professionals. In another RTA, we observe different dynamics. There, we may note the rise of regional associations of wildlife hunters, the expansion of furniture manufacturers, and the internationalization of transportation departments.  In some cases, of course, analogous organizations develop regional structures and programs across different RTAs. In those cases, there will still be important differences across organizations in terms of the specific structures and programs that they develop. If, for instance, farmers’ lobbying groups emerge at the regional level in two RTAs, their membership bases and their objectives are likely to vary. Similarly, if textile companies expand internationally in two given RTAs, what exactly they set up and what they produce are likely to differ.
RTAs, then, exhibit significantly differencest in their legal and organizational landscapes. Whaty suchcan explain such variance in law and organizational developments? Regional market building - much like national market building - is a social process (Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). In particular, it occurs in thick institutional contexts. Historical institutionalist theorists emphasize the influence of pre-existing institutions on actors’ choices and actions (Thelen 1999, p. 388; Pierson 2000). Various institutions are deemed important (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, p. 9; Torfing 2001, pp. 283-84). For some scholars, key institutions include informal factors such as practices, traditions, habits, and so on. For others, they include more formal factors such as legal codes, official organizational structures, the distribution of resources among players, and so on. Regardless of their particular position, all proponents agree that institutions work by constraining, channeling, or enabling actors and their choices. Change, in this school of thought, seldom represents an abrupt departure from the past. 
In line with these insights, this articlethis paper claims that, when crafting regional laws, RTA officials have tended not to produce definitional and normative definitions that would challenge national legal traditions and the preferences of power societal players that have thrived in ---- (and often driven ----) those traditions. Behaving otherwise would, if repeated over time, undermine the legitimacy and usefulness of the particular RTA in question (Duina 1999). Officials have instead produced Behaving otherwise would, if repeated over time, undermine the legitimacy and usefulness of the particular RTA in question (Duina 1999). RTA officials have thus crafted rrRegional laws thusthat often that ‘builds’ upon legal principles that most, if not all, member states already share. : theyThose laws typically target aspects of the world that are regulated in most, if not all, member states, and they articulate definitional and normative principles that replicatereassert, or only mildly depart from, existing national principles..  
Organizational changes also reflect existing institutional realities. Resourceful oOrganizations with an international outlook are the most likely to become active at the regional level as integration progresses. Organizations with limited resources and a historical tendency to operate within national borders are the least likely to respond to integration by expanding their operations at the regional leveldo so. that develop regional capacities are typically rich in resources: they have thrived in their domestic environments and are now ready for expansion. Seldom do organizations that are struggling at the national level respond to integration by asserting themselves at the regional level. At the same time, the very presence of regional law in certain areas of social life shapes organizational developments: it creates a space and incentives for any given organizations to become transnational.  This happens differently for different types of organizationsis especially so for state administrations:  responsible for enforcing regional law,: they are often ordered to establish permanent transnational forums for cooperation and to set up domestic units charged with to overseeing the implementation of regional principles (Mény, Muller, and Quermonne, 1996). Regional law also encourages, however, interest groups active in a given realm to develop transnational lobbying agendas and structures ( (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Mazey and Richardson, 2001). Businesses, too, as well, respond to regional law: . tThe standardization of selected objects and processes in an industry lowers the costs of setting up new plants and operations in other member states.​[5]​ Regional definitions and norms about a given aspect of social life encourage interest groups active in that realm to develop transnational agendas and membership bases aimed at supporting or challenging those definitions and norms (Imig and Tarrow; Mazey and Richardson, 2001)​[6]​ And the need to enforce certain definitions and visions for selected aspects of social life pressures selected state departments to become active in permanent transnational forums and to develop domestic arms to oversee the implementation of the specific laws in question (Mény, Muller, and Quermonne, 1996). 	
Given these links between regional law and organizations, we are likely to see, in a given RTA, the parallel evolution of law and societal organizations in certain spheres of social life. As regional law takes shape and offers the underpinnings for an economically integrated area, resourceful and internationally -minded organizations adapt by expanding their operations in tandem with such law. This process particularizes each RTAs, with important implications for our understanding not only of integration itself but also of broader topics of current debate.













Decoupling as main source of divergence.


The Incompleteness of Blueprints








Planners of Mercosur explicitly turned to the EU when defining the objectives, organization and programs of a common market between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. In the media, discussions of the EU being a model for future economic activity were openly discussed . . . .

Thus, the objectives were similarly balanced :


Organizationally, Mercosur planners deviated little from the EU:


Programmatically, they relied on a two-tier, rational system of law:




























Lit on economic sociology (emebddedness of markets) confirmed:
METHODS
The empirical analysis of this articlepaper focuses on three RTAs: the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur. By most standards, the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur represent the most important and successful efforts toward economic integration.
The EU has twenty-five countries spanning from Ireland and Estonia to Italy and Malta. The major push for market integration took place with the Single European Act of 1986, when leaders agreed to complete the vision of a common market: a space where goods, services, capital, and labor could circulate free from tariff as well as non-tariff barriers (Articles 3 and 23 of TEC).​[7]​ In 2003, the EU was the second largest RTA, with a combined GDP of around US$8 trillion. A good measure of integration success is the increase in one member state’s exports to the other member states as a percentage of that country’s total exports since joining the bloc.  For 1958-1995, with the exception of Ireland and Greece, member states show an average increase of 25 percentage points from the time of entry to 1995 (Cameron 1998).
NAFTA, launched in 1994, brings together Canada, Mexico and the United States. It is a free trade area: a space where goods, services, and some capital but no labor are to circulate freely (Article 101 of NAFTA). It is the largest RTA in the world, with a combined GDP in 2003 of US$11 trillion. For 1994-2000, member states saw an average increase of 3 percentage points in their intra-regional trade as a percentage of all exports.
Mercosur, with the Treaty of Asunción of 1991 and Protocol of Ouro Preto of 1995, brings together Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.  Like the EU, Mercosur aims to become a common market (Article 1 of the Treaty of Asunción). Mercosur had a GDP of around US$700 billion in 2003, making it the third largest RTA in existence. Intra-trade as a percentage of all exports increased by a dramatic 33 percentage points during the period 1991-2000.​[8]​
The empirical analysis concerns legal and organizational developments in these three RTAs. Regional law constitutes the architectural core of each RTA. Organizations - and in particular interest groups, businesses, and national administrations - are central actors in society. Evidence of variation in both areas points, therefore, to crucial and important differences across RTAs. Attention turns to law and organizations in three subject areas: working women, dairy products, and labor rights. These are three very important policy areas covering both economic and social issues.  They also offer some of the clearest and most remarkable evidence of systematic legal and organizational variation across RTAs.  
In the case of law, attention turns to the legal instruments used by market officials to build regional markets. These are EU directives and regulations (Article 249 of The Treaty of the European Communities), the NAFTA text plus its corollary agreement on labor (the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, or NAALC), and Mercosur decisions and resolutions (Article 40 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto). The EU’s own categorization of laws into topics (such as agriculture, social policy, etc.) helps us identify relevant laws in the three subject areas in question. A keyword search in the EU’s legal database allows us to identify additional laws.​[9]​ For Mercosur, keyword searches of databases, secondary legal sources, and a comprehensive review of all laws can lead to the identification of the relevant laws. 





Women in the Workplace
In the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur women have increased their participation in the labor force (Doorne-Huiskes et al. 1995; Ulshoefer 1998; Gabriel and Macdonald 1994, p. 537). Yet, only in the EU have officials developed an extensive legal system rich with definitional and normative notions about women. Table 1 identifies the key EU legislation on women:
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Table 1: EU Law on Women in the Workplace

General Area	Specific Issues
Pay	Equal pay for equal work or work of equal value (D. 75/117)
Workplace treatment	Equal treatment in employment, occupation, vocational training, promotion, and working conditions (D. 76/207, D. 2000/78)
Social Security Benefits	Women’s ability to contribute and benefit from social security schemes at the workplace (D. 79/7)
Occupational Security schemes	Equal treatment with regards to scope, obligations and benefits vis-à-vis social security schemes (D. 86/378)
Pregnancy and Motherhood	Pregnant women’s rights at the workplace (D. 86/613), parental leave benefits for men and women (D. 96/34), safety and wellbeing of pregnant or breast-feeding mothers at the workplace (D. 92/85)
Mainstreaming	Gender perspective for EU international development policies and interventions (R. 2836/1998), and for EU regional development programs (R. 2836/98)
Note. - Numbers in parentheses refer to EU directives (if preceded by D) and regulations (if preceded by R).


Scholars have described two fundamental phases in the evolution of EU law on women. In the first phase, during the 1970s and 1980s, planners focused on promoting equal pay between the genders: defining and regulating of wages, benefits, and so on. In the second phase, during the 1990s, planners focused on granting women equality of treatment and opportunities (Pollack and Hafner Burton 2001).​[11]​ 
NAFTA has by contrast produced only one major normative principle in favor of working women. NAFTA’s labor agreement is known as the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). It was adopted as part of the Free Trade Agreement in 1994, and committed Canada, Mexico and the United States to the promotion of eleven “Labor Principles”. Its eighth principle requires member states to commit themselves to equal pay for men and women. Member states are to ensure “equal wages for women and men by applying the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same establishment” (NAALC, Annex 1). With this principle, NAFTA has taken a first step towards the development of regional-level laws about women.
Mercosur’s approach to women has been even more limited than that of NAFTA. On various occasions, officials have stated their commitment to pursue policies on behalf of women and to ensure the right institutional environment to that end (Espino 2000, p. 21). For instance, in Article 3 of the 1998 Social and Labor Declaration - a document that, unlike any other joint declaration, became legally binding - the governments asserted their general support for equality of opportunity and treatment at the workplace. Yet, by the end of 2002, the only concrete measure in place was Resolution 84/2000, which asked Mercosur working forums and groups to incorporate a gender perspective into their deliberations.  
Organizational developments have paralleled legal developments in the three RTAs. Interest groups representing the interests of working women at a regional level have mushroomed across Europe. Members include individuals and organizations from every member state. Table 2 lists the major European women’s groups:.


Table 2: Major European-Level Women’s Interest Groups

Group & Year of Birth 	Program	Membership Base
European Women’s Lobby (EWL) - 1990	Lobby EU to promote equality, rights at work and in societyCoordinate activities of national and European women’s groups Ensure implementation of EU gender laws 	3,000 national and EU-wide groupsIndividuals who are members of national groupsDutch President, French and Portuguese Vice PresidentsBoard members from every member state
European Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) - 2000	Improve public understanding of EU laws on work and womenDefend women’s interests in the EUStrengthen links and understanding among female lawyers in the EU	National women lawyers’ associationsIndividual lawyers from member statesOne board official from each member state
European Federation of Women Working in the Home (FEFAF) - 1983	Lobby EU Parliament and Commission to recognize worth of domestic workEase transition from domestic work to workplace for European women	Organizations from EU member states and Switzerland
Business and Professional Women / Europe (BPWE) - 1985	Equal opportunity and status for women in economic, civil and political lifePromote the number of women in decision-making positions	Individuals and groups from EU but also Switzerland, Iceland and other countriesOfficers from all EU countries
European Institute of Women’s Health (EIWH) - 1996	Promote health and well being of women (both at work and beyond) as a priority for the European CommissionResearch on women’s health issues on a European levelPromote equality in healthcare treatment and options for women in the EUPresent recommendations to European Parliament	Individuals from member statesHealth care professionals from member statesWomen’s interest groupsPatient organizations
Note. -  Internet addresses of these groups are as follows: EWL: www.womenslobby.org; EWLA: www.ewla.org; FEFAF: www.fefaf.org; BPWE: www.bpw-europe.org; EIWH: www.eurohealth.ie.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE


The most prominent European group is the EWL. Founded in 1990, the EWL has over 3,000 national and EU-wide member organizations, and close links with national women’s groups that are not formal members (European Women’s Lobby 2000, p. 14; Sperling and Bretherton 1996; Mazey 1998). Based in Brussels, its primary mission is to interact with the European Commission to evaluate and influence the development of EU laws, most of which concern working women. The EWL also strives to inform working women of their rights under EU law through extensive campaigns and press releases. The EWLA is a second major group. Founded in 2000, it is above all a networking body, linking thousands of female lawyers across member states. It too lobbies the Commission but perhaps focuses mostly on research and education on the rights of working women in the EU. To that end, the ELWA organizes a yearly congress and conferences, sponsors research projects, disseminates publications and information, and comments on drafts of EU legislationpolicies. A third noteworthy organization is FEFAF, with its focus on promoting EU recognition of domestic work and helping women transition from domestic work to the workplace.
This impressive regional mobilization on the part of European women has had no parallel in NAFTA. Mujer a Mujer was one exception: the group was responsible for organizing the 1992 Tri-national Working Women’s Conference on Free Trade and Continental Integration but ceased operations in the mid-1990s because of lack of funding. It was a genuine regional organization, formed in the late 1980s by women in the United States, Canada, and Mexico to respond to economic integration, and with offices in Mexico City and San Antonio, Texas. Other examples of transnational cooperation exist, but they are ad-hoc and without formal character (Domínguez, 2002, p. 230). Otherwise, 

aAll sustained activism in relation to NAFTA has instead taken place within the confines of purely  national-level groups. These are organizations with purely national membership bases and leadership that have responded to economic integration with a partial broadening of their agendas and, in some cases, some collaboration with like-minded groups across frontiers. Perhaps the most relevant group is the C, such as the Coalition for Women’s Economic Development and Global Equality in, which operates in the United States (Liebowitz 2002, p. 187; White, Salas and Gammage 2003, p. iii), or. NAC is a second important organization. The group is by far the most influential representative of women’s interests in Canada (Macdonald 2002: 159; Carlyle 2002). NAC has quickly become the most important women’s group in Canada to monitor progress at the NAFTA level, educate citizens, sponsor reports, and lobby (; Gabriel and Macdonald 1994, pp. 549-554). Additional, but less noteworthy, examples come from Mexico, where women have relied on existing labor and other organizations to express their concerns about economic integration (Macdonald 2002, p. 557). 
In Mercosur, there is only one major regional-level interest groups representing working women, and women more generally: the Reunión Especializada de la Mujer (REM). The REM was established in Buenos Aires in 1995 as Mercosur’s Foro de la Mujer and quickly opened official chapters in all four of the member states. With Resolution 20/98, Mercosur officials granted the group a permanent place in its consultative body Foro Consultive Económico y Social and assigned to it the name REM. In its position, the REM is in regular contact with national trade unions and workers’ organizations (Ulshoefer 1998), and has offered the Common Market Group a gender perspective as it produces laws that affect women. The They include the Sub-Secretary for Women in the Ministry of External Relations, International Commerce and Culture in Argentina, the National Council for Women’s Rights in Brazil, the Secretary for Women in Paraguay and the National Institute for the Family and Women in Ururgay. The REMItYet, REM is alone in its activities and has thus far enjoyed a very limited impact over Mercosur law, prompting UNESCO various observers were thus correct wheto note that n they skeptically states that “it needs to be asked whether “the Mercosur process” has so far failed to “s is encouraging[e] the creation of a women’s movement that is regional in nature” (Jelin, Valdés and Bareiro 1998, p. 9).

Dairy Products 
Contrary to their approach to the world of women, EU officials have hesitated to develop definitional and normative laws on dairy products. They have instead relied on Regulation 2081/92 to claim that much of dairy production cannot be subject to standardization. Often applied to cheeses but also to creams and butters, the regulation recognizes small geographical regions (typically areas with a radius of 30 or fewer miles) as having the exclusive right to manufacture certain products. As a result, in a country such as Italy, the EU recognizes that over 30 cheeses have been protected from standardization. In France, over 40 cheeses but also butters and creams enjoy protection.​[12]​ Other countries, such as Spain, Ireland, and Germany, have followed suit, also with butters, cheeses, and other products.
The few EU laws with definitional and normative content focus on milk and milk derivatives.​[13]​ The most important is Regulation 2597/97, which defines various types of drinking milk (raw, whole, skimmed, etc.) on the basis of content, weight, and production processes. Caseins and caseinates are targeted with normative principles only regarding their use in cheeses. The remaining 80 or so regulations and directives categorized in the EU’s legal database as related to Milk Products (3.60.56) concern themselves with financial aid to farmers, setting production quotas, granting licenses and other administrative matters of no definitional relevance and of very limited, if any, normative relevance.  
As is the case with the EU, NAFTA officials have produced no significant pronouncements about dairy products. In the area of agricultural products, Article 713 of NAFTA simply asks that member states use relevant international standards, guidelines, or recommendations for sanitary purposes. Without a single definition or vision, NAFTA goes even further than the EU in avoiding regional standardization.




Table 3: Mercosur Laws on Dairy Products

General Area	Target
Milk	Powdered milk (31/93, 82/93), fluid milk (78/94), milk for industrial use (80/94)
Cheese Products	Processed cheese and pasteurized cheese (134/96), powder cheese (136/96)
Specific Cheeses	Minas Frescal (44/98, 145/96), Parmesan, Reggiano, Reggianito, Srbinz (1/97), Azul (48/97), Tybo (42/96), Pategrás Sandwich (30/96), Tilsit (32/96), Danbo (29/96), Tandil (31/96), Mozzarella (34/96, 78/96)
Creams and Fats	Butter (70/93), butter oil fat (63/94), milk fat (71/93, 72/93), milk cream for industrial use (76/94)
Milk Derivatives	Caseinates (16/94), caseins (43/94)
Desserts	Doce de Leite (137/96)
Note. - Numbers in parentheses refer to Mercosur Resolutions.
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All laws in Table 3 are rich with definitional and normative principles. They typically state that their objective is to “fix the identity and quality characteristics” of the product at hand. For instance, when addressing Tybo cheese with Resoultion 42/96, Mercosur specifies in Article 5 requirements for ingredients, senses (texture, color, flavor, smell), shape and weight, physical and chemical composition, and production process. On the normative side, the law specifies in Article 7 handling, hygienic, and other requirements. 
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Table 4: Major Dairy Companies in the European Union

	Company	Revenues in US$ (millions)	Plants in Home Country (2002)	Plants in Other EU Countries (2002)
GERMANY	Nordmilch	2000 (2000) a	15 a	0 d
	Humana Milchunion	1608 (2000)	11 a	0 d
	Campina - Germany	1266 (2000) a	6 a, d	22 e(18 Netherlands, 3 Belgium, 1 France)
	Molkerei A. Müller	1335 (2000) a	2 d	1 d (Great Britain)
	Hochwald	572 (2000) a	5 a	0 e
	BMI 	486 (2000) a	7 d	0 d
GREAT BRITAIN	Dairy Crest	2077 (2001) c	15 d	0 a, d
	Express Dairies	1282 (2001)	10 d	0 d
	Arla	712 (2000) b	6 b, d	62 b, d(36 Denmark; 25 Sweden; 1 Greece)
	Robert Wiseman Dairies	434 (1999) c	5 c, d	0 c, d
	The Milk Group	187 (2001) b	2 b	0 b
	ACC-Manufacturing	n.a.	8 b, d	0 b, d
FRANCE	Danone	6597 (2001) b	7 e	13 e(6 Spain; 3 Germany; 1 Belgium; 1 Greece; 1 Italy; 1 Portugal)
	Groupe Lactalis	5000 (2000)	65 e	7 to 9 e(Belgium, England, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Spain)
	Bongrain S. A. 	3500 (2000) c	over 12 b, g	4 b, f(Spain)
	Sodiaal	2563 (2000) a	28 a	4 d, e(1 Ireland; 1 UK; 2 Finland) 
	Fromageries Bel 	1557 (2000) a	8 b	9 b(1 Belgium; 1 Germany; 2 Italy; 2 Portugal; 3 Spain) 

Sources: a = European Dairy Magazine (Special Report: The Leading Dairy Companies in Germany and Mainland Europe 2001); b = Company Website; c = Company Annual Report; d = Telephone Interview with Company Officials (July 2002); e = E-mail Exchange with Company Officials (July 2002); f = Bongrain Financial Report 2001. If no source is given, figures are from media releases and articles.

Note: In terms of daily kilos of milk processed, BMI ranks fifth in Germany, with 2.8 million kilos (vs. 2.3 for Hochwald). Given their similar revenues, both BMI and Hochwald are included in the table.

The situation in NAFTA is similar to that in the EU. The three largest dairies in the United States have no plants in either Canada or Mexico. The fifth largest also has no such plants. Only Schreiber Foods - the fourth largest company - has a single plant in Mexico. Mexican companies have also not expanded in the NAFTA regions. .8The two largest companies - Alpura and the Lala Group - have no plants in the United States or Canada. Nor does GILSA, the fifth largest company. The only two companies with plants are multinationals from Europe: Danone and Nestlé. In the case of Nestlé, moreover, expansion in the three member states preceded the arrival of NAFTA.​[16]​ 




Table 5: Major Dairy Companies in NAFTA

UNITED STATES	Company	Revenues in US$ (millions)	Plants in Home Country (2004)	Plants in other NAFTA countries (2004)
	Dean Dairy Group	8120 (2002) a	95 a,b,c	0 a,b,c
	Kraft 	4100 (2002) a	18 a	0 a
	Land O’Lakes	2899 (2002) a	12 a,c	0 a,c
	Schreiber Foods	2300 (2002) a	16 a	1 a,b,d(Mexico) 
	National Dairy Holdings	2148 (2002) a	32 a,c	0 a,c
MEXICO	Ganaderos Productores de Leche Pura (Alpura)	1328 (2001) f	2 c	0 c
	Lala Group (including Evaproadora Mexicana) 	1152 (2001) f	14 b	0 b
	Nestlé - Mexico	462 (2001) f	6 f, c, d	13 f, b (2 Canada, 11 USA)
	Danone	251 (2001) f	14 d	25 d (5 Canada, 20 USA)
	Grupo Industrial de la Leche S.A (GILSA)	234 (2001) f	1 e	0 e
CANADA	Saputo	2503 (2002) a	35 a	15 a(United States)
	Parmalat - Canada	1800 (2002) a	20 a	6 c (5 United States, 1 Mexico)
	Agropur Coop	1327 (2002) a	20 a, c	1 a, c(United States)
	Kraft - Canada	n.a.	2 d	19 a, d(18 United States, 1 Mexico)
	Nestlé - Canada	n.a. 	2 d	17 d (11 United States, 6 Mexico)

Sources; a = Dairy Foods Magazine (Annual Report on Top 100 Dairy Companies in North America, 2003); b = Company Website; c = Telephone Interview with Company Officials (February - March 2004); d = E-mail Exchange with Company Officials (Feburary - April 2004); e = Telephone Interview with Alpura official; f = Figures estimated from data assembled from Datamonitor Industry Market Research reports from January 2002 (“Mexico: Liquid Milk”; “Mexico: Powdered Milk”; “Mexico: Concentrated Milk”; “Mexico: Yogurt”; “Mexico: Processed Cheese”). 
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Matters followed quite a different course in Mercosur. Until the early 1990s, the major dairy companies in the region had only national production infrastructures. By 2003, all of Argentina’s five largest producers possessed plants in Brazil. In 1990, only one (Nestlé) did. Expansion was rapid. In 2001, Sancor - Argentina’s largest dairy company - signed an agreement with Mococa of Brazil to have branded products produced directly in Brazil. In 1998, Mastellano (Argentina’s second largest firm) bought Leitesol of Brazil, a powder milk facility to be used for the breakdown of large powder milk shipments, packaging and labeling of Mastellano products. And in 1998 Milkaut (Argentina’s fourth largest dairy company) bought Ivoti Plan in Rio Grande del Sul (Brazil) to produce milk products there. Danone (today the country’s third largest dairy producer) established its production capacity in Argentina in 1997, after being in Brazil since 1970. 





Table 6: Major Dairy Companies in Mercosur

ARGENTINA	Company	Revenues in US$ (millions)	Plants in Home Country (2002)	Plants in Other Mercosur Countries (2002)
	Sancor	870 (2000)	18 b	1 d(Brazil)
	Mastellone/La Serenísima	700 (2000)	6	1 d(Brazil)
	Danone – Argentina	288 (2000) c	1 e	2 e(Brazil)
	Milkaut 	240 (1999)	17 d	1 d(Brazil)
	Nestlé – Argentina	n.a.	5 b, e	10 b, e(Brazil)
BRAZIL	Nestlé –Brazil	n.a.	10 b, e	5 (Argentina) b, e
	Parmalat – Brazil	963 (2000) d	17 b	20 b (8 Argentina, 12 Paraguay and Uruguay)
	Itambé	550 (1996) a	14 e	0 b, e
	Danone – Brazil	179 (2000) c	2 e	1 b, e(Argentina)
	Grupo Vigor	n.a.	3 d	0 d

Sources: a = Taccone and Garay (1999: 259); b = Company Website; c = Company Annual Report; d = Telephone Interview with Company Officials (July 2002); e = E-mail Exchange with Company Officials (July 2002). A general source of information for the Brazilian case was Ministério da Fazenda (Parecer N.172/COPGA/SEAE/MF, 22 May 2002, Brasila, Brazil).  If no source is given, figures are from media releases and articles.
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Labor Rights
Officials in the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur have agreed on the need to endow workers with rights. But they have articulated different ideas about what those rights should be. In the areas of social security, only in the EU do those rights include migrant workers’ unemployment benefits. Only in Mercosur and NAFTA, on the other hand, do they include the rights to association and strike. 
EU Regulation 1408/71 of June 1971 grants migrant workers, originating from one of the member states, and their families social security benefits identical to those enjoyed by native workers. Chapters 1 through 6 identify those benefits: sickness and maternity, invalidity, old age and death, work accidents, occupational diseases, death grants, and unemployment. With Decision 19/97 (still in need of ratification by Paraguay and thus not in force yet), Mercosur officials recognize that migrant workers should be entitled to the same rights as native workers. However, they offer a significantly less comprehensive list of what those rights include. Unemployment rights (along with maternity rights, work accidents, occupational diseases) are missing. NAFTA officials have similarly avoided taking any steps in the direction of unemployment rights, choosing instead to focus on working conditions (NAALC, Annex 1). 
EU officials have, on the other hand, hesitated to grant workers the rights to form labor associations and to strike.  Indeed, the TEC excludes both rights explicitly from the domain of EU activities (Article 137). The 2000 Treaty of Niece presented an opportunity to amend the TEC with the introduction of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which recognizes the right to form trade unions and strike (Articles 12 and 28). But the European Council recognized but refused to adopt the charter as legal or binding (Declaration No.23 of the Treaty of Niece).​[18]​ The current constitution of the European Union (still in need of ratification by all the member states and therefore not valid) recognizes the right to form unions and strike, but the relevant charter comes with highly ambiguous language. Its application seems to be limited to the institutions of the EU and not to workers elsewhere. Moreover, its principles must be applied within the context of national customs and laws, which implies that countries without the rights to form unions and strikes will not be expected to comply.
By contrast, the first principle of NAFTA’s NAALC is the “freedom of association and protection of the right to organize”; the third principle is “the right of workers to strike in order to defend their interests” (Annex 1). Such impressive rights are subject to the particular stipulations of each member state,​[19]​ but they are nonetheless considered unalienable. Mercosur officials have, in turn, recognized the rights to form unions and strike in the Social and Labor Declaration of December 10, 1998, which became a binding and legal text with immediate application upon promulgation. In a key passage, the declaration states: “All workers and trade union organizations are guaranteed the right to strike” (Article 11). The right must be exercised in conformity with existing national laws (Articles 10 and 11), but it cannot be denied by member states. The right of association is stated in Article 8.

On the organizational front, we observe that 
national labor and employment departments in all three RTAs have become active in permanent transnational bodies dedicated to the promotion of selected labor rights. They have also developed domestic units charged with overseeing the enforcement of regional laborthose rights. Yet, important differences set these departments apart. In the EU, they are involved in one major transnational administrative body concerned with thea key area of activity isconcerns the unemployment (and other social security) rights of migrant workers , as articulated in Regulation 1408/71. Composed exclusively of national representatives, and attached organizationally to the European Commission, the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers (ACSSMW) is charged with overseeing all administrative, technical, and financial questions associated with the implementation of the principles of Regulationstrives to ensure that those rights are respected 1408/71. With a budget, in 2002, of  €1.6 million, it meets several times a year. Its meetings and activities regularly concern unemployment benefits.​[20]​ Aiding the ACSSMW is a second transnational administrative body: the Advisory Committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers. It serves as a forum for representatives from national labor and employment departments to meet with representatives of trade unions and employer organizations. 
Domestically, European labor and employment departments have developed institutional capacity to process and oversee unemployment claims by migrant workers. The management of Form E-303 offers an example. Form E-303 allows citizens of one EU country to receive unemployment payments for three months as they search for work in a second country. The host country is to process the request, but workers are required to complete the form before leaving their home country (the home country must then reimburse the host country for its payments). Thus, in Sweden for instance, offices of the Labor Market Administration manage Form E-303. In Denmark, the Public Employment Office handles those forms. In Belgium, a more decentralized country, regions have a branch of the Department of Employment charged with the task: VDAB for Flanders, FOREM for Wallonia and BGDA/ORBEM for Brussels.
In the case of NAFTA too has witnessed the rise of , labor and employment departments with regional  are not concerned with hcharacteristics. None, however, is dedicated to helping migrant workers receive unemployment benefits. Instead, we note that national departments of labor and employmentthey have undergone changes in developed structures and programs order to protect the rights of workers as specified by the NAALC --- including, therefore, the right to strike and nd form unions ---- along with the other rights as set out inby the NAALC. At the transnational level, representatives from the labor and employment departments have a permanent structure for interaction: the Commission for Labor Cooperation. At the heart of the commission is the Council of Ministers. This is a body composed of the Secretary of Labor from the United States, the Secretarío del Trabajo y Previsión Social  from Mexico, and the Minister of Labor from Canada. The modus operandi of the council is simple: to act as a single entity aiming to promote the principles of the NAALC. As such, the council carries out several functions. These include conductingThe council conducts research and proposesing policies on topics related to the rights to strike and form unions (as well as the other rights stated in the NAALC), participatesing in the process of dispute resolution, and keepsing the public abreast of relevant legal and policy developments. Thus, in February 2001 for instance, representatives from Canada and the United States held in Toronto a “one-and-a-half day cooperative activity . . . to examine the general scope of protection of the right to organize” in the two countries (Commission  for Labor Cooperation 2001, p. 11). 
The internal structure of national labor departments has also changed, in ways that reflect directly the principles set out in the NAALC. There now exist National Administrative Offices (NAOs) in the labor departments of the three member states, each ccharged with developing and receiving complaints about alleged violations of NAALC the labor principles, publishing reports, exchanging information, and much more. As of January 1, 2001, nearly 25 complaints had been filed with the three NAOs (Compa, 2001, p. 454), all of which were closely monitored by the council. Thirteen involved the right of workers to associate. One involved the right to strike. 
In Mercosur, the Social and Labor Commission of Mercosur (Comisión Sociolaboral del Mercosur) created with Resolution 12/2000, is designed to promote the rights of workers covered by the Social and Labor Declaration of December 10, 1998. These include both the rights to form unions and strike. National departments have a permanent representative in the commission (national employer and labor unions also have one representative each). The commission inspects yearly reports on member states’ formal and practical compliance with workers’ rights (Article 9 of Resolution 12/2000), and formulates action programs and recommendations. 
To aid the Social and Labor Commission of Mercosur, member states have, in turn, set up National Commissions (Comisiones Nacionales) (Resolution 85/2000). These commissions collaborate with the departments of labor or employment in each country to gather information on all issue areas covered by the declaration. Each year, the commissions are asked to place special focus on selected rights. In 2002 attention was on Article 8, which states the right to form unions (2002 Program of the Social and Labor Commission). The right to strike is certain to be on future programs, most likely in 2005 or 2006. 

INTEGRATION AND CONTINUITY
How are we to account for these remarkable differences across RTAs? As historical institutionalists would predict, RTA officials, partly in response to pressure from powerful societal players, have crafted regional laws that often buildoffer much continuity upon with the legal traditions of the member states. Organizations that developthat have developed regional capacities have typically thrived in their domestic environments and have already shown a propensity for activism at the international level. In the case of national administrations especially, tTare ready for expansion. They have also responded to the arrival of regional lawregulating their spheres of action. in their realms of action.

Women in the Workplace
The articulation of a rich system of EU laws on women reflected legal and political developments in European countries from the 1960s on. By the 1970s the member states had developed a plethora ofextensive national legal frameworks that would attract, and maximize the contribution of, women to the workforce. The most impressive advances were made in northern countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark (Outshoorn and Swiebel 1998; Walter 2001). But non-discrimination, pay, and equal opportunities laws were also passed in France, Germany and Great Britain during the 1960s and later years (Duina 1999). As integration progressed in the 1970s, the position and rights of working women at the regional level became increasingly important issues. EU officials responded by crafting laws that broadly replicatedstated, at the regional level, core principles found throughoutin most, if not all, the member states. Aggressive proposals that forced member states to accept new values and principles were strongly opposed by national representatives. Those that fell “within the range” of existing member states’ approaches were instead adopted (Ostner and Lewis 1995, p.159).  Thus, as “EU officials, when addressing problems and ,had a rich toolset from which to” observed Cécile Greboval, Policy Coordinator forof the EWL, put it in a conversation with the author, , “EU officials translated or otherwise expanded upon concepts and visions that were already in place across much of Europe.”“”​[21]​	


AtThese advances set a precedent for EU officials, as well as a problem: differences in regulatory requirements translated into differences in cost structures across countries and thus uneven and unfair competition. The logical solution was the articulation of regional level laws that would harmonize those differences. quote

At the same time, women’s groups from various member states exerted “the political pressure of feminism and other social movements” for legal action at the regional level had become “intense” pressure on those officials to act (Rossilli 1999, p. 173). These groups were responsible for many of theAfter scoring victories on the domestic front, they sought to play a  advances in their respective countries from the 1960s on. Now, they were ready to play a “catalytic role in the development of EC [European Community] equal opportunities legislation” (Mazey 1995, p. 592; Warner 1984). In some cases, Commission officials engaged in close and sustained “interactions with leading feminists and women’s movements” (Liebert 1999, p. 198). In other cases, women mobilized in the streets to force the officials’ hands. When, for instance, the social affairs ministers met in 1975 to discuss the fate of an anti-discrimination proposal, activists stood nearby, pressuring officials to adopt the text. “Approval” of Directive 76/207, a journalist noted, “came quickly, perhaps accelerated by a women's rights demonstration to greet the ministers' arrival” (The Economist 1975). 
If women had the resources to push for regional law, they also had the resources to establish EU-level organizations. “By 1969,” an observer noted “women’s groups were forming all over Western Europe” (Warner 1984, p. 147) “The late 1960s and early 1970s,” a second observer wrote, “were characterized by the growth of women’s movements throughout Western Europe” (Mazey 1995, p. 597). These were strong and active groups, which would naturally seek transnational cooperation as integration progressed. “By the 1990s, wWomen,” as Cécile Greboval of theall-important European Women’s LobbyEWL explained, “were perfectly poised for transnational activism: they had the resources, skills, and membership bases.”​[22]​
Yet, there was a seconda critical stimulant for thei formation of the EWL, EWLA, and the other EU-level groupsr at the regional level was : the very rapid growth of EU law on women. Indeed , Tthe central mission – indeed raison d’être - of all of these groups has been to influence the development of EU law on women as well as ensure the implementation of favorable legislation. EU law. As an expert observer put it, EU law on women and the “transnational European women’s lobby” live in a close relationship, each influencing the other in fundamental ways (Mazey 1998, p. 142; 1995: p. 592; 2000). The EWL, for instance, focuses almost exclusively on pressuring the EU to “promote equality between women and men and to ensure that gender equality and women’s rights are taken into consideration” in all of its policies (European Women’s Lobby 2000, p. 2). In the words of Cécile Greboval, the organization “lives in a close symbiotic relationship with EU law . . . since the legislative and policy agenda of the EU shape directly what we do.” Similarly, the EWLA aims “to improve the understanding of European legislation in relation to equal opportunities, with particular reference to women” (European Women Lawyers Association 2002). Much the same can be said for the FEFAF, BPWE, and EIWH.
In NAFTA, the legal preconditions for regional law on women actually existed: all three member states had significant legislation on women.​[23]​ What was curiously missing in this case was aa lack of interest, on the part of key women’s interest groups, to, to shape the course of international affairs see the articulation of NAFTA laws on their behalf:

During the NAFTA debate, women’s groups failed to make the gendered dimension of regionalization visible in public debate and have had virtually no impact on either the NAFTA text or on broader public policy related to integration. This failure to influence the policy outcome can be contrasted with the greater success of other social movements, like labour and the environmental movements . . . only the Canadian women’s movement organized widely at the national level in response to NAFTA (MacDonald 2002, p. 152).

The absence of pressure from women’s groups from the United States was especially conspicuous. “US-based women’s organizations were virtually absent from transnational organizing around the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement” (Liebowitz 2002, p. 145). Two key organizations - the National Organization for Women and the Fund for the Feminist Majority (now the Feminist Majority Foundation) “showed little interest” in influencing the course that NAFTA would take (Liebowitz 2002, p. 177). Much of their behavior was the result of a longstanding disinterest in international events and, especially, international trade (Liebowitz 2002; MadDonald 2002). Mexican women too proved fairly uninterested in NAFTA: accustomed to a marginal role in their societies, many actually viewed integration as a promising step towards better employment opportunities (Gabriel and MacDonald 1994, pp. 539-540).
The same lack of interest in international matters on the part of groups from the United States largely explains why regional-level women’s groups have failed to form at the NAFTA level. As Macdonald recently reasoned, “the nature of the women’s movements in the three countries foreclosed the possibilities of greater contestation of the form of economic liberalization at . . . the transnational levels (Macdonald 2002, p.152, italics added). At the same time, the absence of a rich system of regional law that could offer a tangible and realistic target for regional mobilization, surely played a role. 
In Mercosur, the institutional preconditions for regional law and organizations were simplyaltogether missing. Women in the Mercosur member states have only recently begun to organize effectively and score some legislative victories. Long dictatorships championing conservative values precluded any progress in all four member states well until the early 1980s. For instance, Brazil’s most important organization - the National Council for Women’s Rights - was born in 1985. Argentina’s Women’s Cabinet was established in 1989. Their objectives were basic. In Brazil, the council lobbied legislators to ensure that the new 1988 constitution would state that men and women were equal citizens (Pitanguy 1998, p.104). They succeeded, but were then effectively silenced until 1995 by the conservative and powerful Ministry of Justice (Pitanguy 1998, p. 108). In Argentina, the struggle concerned equality within the family. The most important advances in the workplace, in all four Mercosur countries, was the repeal of paternalistic laws safeguarding women from various hardships rather than the adoption of progressive laws (Navarro 2001, p. 12). 
Thus, in the words of Beatriz Etchechury Mazza, an official from Uruguay’s administration and a participant in Mercosur policymaking,​[24]​ “by choosing not to produce regional laws on behalf of women, Mercosur officials simply recognized the legal and political realities in the member states”. In this type of environment, she then added, few have expected any women’s group to become active at the regional level: “Just now women have begun to assert themselves as important players in their countries . . . it is too early for them to really play a role in Mercosur; all that will take time.” ​[25]​

Dairy Products
Standardizing dairy products and procedures in the EU would have challenged longstanding traditions of granting farmers and companies the exclusive right to manufacture specific types of cheeses, butters, and creams. Those traditions, Mauro Poinelli - a representative of Coldiretti (Italy’s largest agricultural lobbying groups) active in Brussels - explained to the author, “served the dual purpose of protecting a way of doing things and guaranteeing a high level of quality.”​[26]​ Thus, Beginning in the early 1900s, Italian, French, and Spanish farmers had fought for, and obtained, protected denominations for a large variety of products. In 1954, the Italian government passed Law 125/1954 authorizing such denominations. In 1955, it recognized four cheeses​[27]​ as protected (de Roest and Menghi 2000, pp. 440-441). Tens and tens of denominations became eventually protected (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1997, Chapter IX). In France, the early battles centered on wine. Later, they concerned dairy products. In the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, a large number of cheeses, butters, and creams became protected.​[28]​ 
Administrative building to process requests and ensure compliance followed. In Italy, the Comitato Nazionale per la Tutela della Denominazione di Origine e Tipiche dei Formaggi was set up in the 1950s within the Ministero delle Risorse Agricole, Alimentari e Forestali. In 1947, the French government founded by legal decree the Institut National des Appellations d'Origine (INAO).  Within INAO, it established the Comité National des Produits Laitiers exclusively for the protection of dairy products (Echikson 1998). The Spanish government followed in 1970 with the establishment of the Instituto Nacional de Denominaciones de Origen. These offices joined forces with farmers and national politicians to establish a powerful lobbying presence in Brussels. Over time, they have systematically, and successfully, pressured EU officials not to subject the dairy world to definitional and normative standardization. French agriculture minister Hervé Gaymard, along with six other agriculture ministers, recently sent a letter to several European newspapers that concisely captured the spirit of years of pleas:

For us, agricultural products are more than marketable goods; they are the fruit of a love of an occupation and of the land, which has been developed over many generations . . . For us, farmers must not become the ‘variable adjustment' of a dehumanised and standardised world. 
     (Economist 2002, pp.18-20)

National protectionism of local producers and, equally importantly, an EU legal system that recognized a monopoly of local producers over a wide array of products, in turn, heavily shaped the strategies of dairy producers. Expansion into a different country became a challenge: it required significant knowledge of local traditions and processes, and access to the required raw materials. As Pierluigi Londero, of the Directorate General on Agriculture of the European Commission, explained to the author, this environment discouraged but the most aggressive companies from seeking international expansion:

In theory, a Germany company can therefore set up shop in, say, France. In practice, this is actually quite difficult. There is a tremendous variety of products across countries: the required knowledge and familiarity is simply not there for foreigners. I have a hard time imagining a German company setting up shop in France to sell a certain type of Brie to the French . . . Then, there is the supply side of things. There exist negotiated deals between suppliers and buyers of milk. This makes it very difficult for anyone to arrive in a given market and have access to the local raw material. The only choice would be to acquire a local company, but that is rather difficult to do.

There is, Londero continued, an “artificial stability to the market, one that has prevented financial problems from occurring and has thus deprived the marketplace of a certain dynamism”.​[29]​ Such stability is reflected in the modest growth rates of intra-regional trade. European Commission data shows a mere 50% increase in the period 1989-2002.​[30]​
Interviews with officials of large dairy companies in Germany and Great Britain revealed a frame of mind that is highly focused on the national dimension. A representative from Britian’s Dairy Crest thus explained his company’s domestic focus as follows: “We have a healthy market here in the UK, and really see no need to set up shop elsewhere”.​[31]​ A second representative from Germany’s BMI stressed her company’s attachment to domestic standards and traditions. “How,” she asked, “could we set up a plant in, say, France? We would need to bring our German milk all the way there . . . that would be impractical”.​[32]​
Matters followed quite a different course in NAFTA. Canada, in line with a long tradition of protectionism for its farmers (Bailey 2002, pp. 5-7; Doyon and Novakovic 1996, pp. 1-3), resisted from the very start all efforts to liberalize the market for dairy products. Its representatives worked hard to ensure that Chapter 7 of the agreement would explicitly exempt their country from having to reduce its barriers in dairy (along with other agricultural sectors) (Scollay 2001, p. 1141). Without a single market for dairy products in the making, officials logically did not engage in any standardization of those products. 
The natural result was to keep the marketplace rather fragmented. Consider, for example, that in the decade 1991-2001, only 6% of all dairy imports into Canada came from NAFTA countries (Brunke 2002, p. 3). For the United States, in turn, Canada has represented a minor trading partner at best, taking in only 11% of its dairy exports and accounting for only 2.5% of its dairy imports. 
All this has obviously not prevented Canadian companies from expanding into the United States, for whom the country is an important trading destination. It has prevented, however, companies from the United States from considering expansion into Canada or Mexico. A representative from Land O’Lakes summarized aptly the implications of Canada’s position for the behavior of companies from the United States: “Canada is a very difficult country to enter: the regulatory environment is tough, the country is closed . . . with all those difficulties, I cannot imagine a company that would be willing to enter the country.”​[33]​ David Phillips, Chief of Dairy Foods Magazine (a publication based in the United States) and an industry expert, reflected on this possibility in an interview with the author:

Certainly, had Canada and Mexico been willing to adopt, say, to agree that all dairy companies use USDA [United States Department of Agriculture] standards, that would have really stimulated the industry in unprecedented ways. It would have made it a lot easier for US companies to think of Canada as part of their market and playing field.​[34]​

By contrast, none of the Mercosur member states have a history of protected denominations, state activism or direct lobbying in Montevideo. Indeed, these countries all witnessed a policy shift during the 1980s and 1990s away from decades of discrimination against agricultural producers (and in favor of heavier industries) and towards a more market-friendly approach (Helfand 2000; Nofal and Wilkinson 1999). Large dairy manufacturers, in turn, eager to expand production capacities and sales through the Mercosur areas, expressed a strong interest in rapid regional standardization. In such an environment, as Maximiliano Moreno - a participant in Mercosur’s legislative activities on dairy​[35]​ - explained to the author, “differences in production norms and sanitary requirements naturally came to be seen as hindering the development of the dairy industry.”​[36]​ Officials thus embarked rather aggressively on a process of technical harmonization (Spanish Newswire Services 2000; Spanish Newswire Services 1999).
Regulatory harmonization stimulated intra-regional trade. Truly astonishing data is available for the period 1986-1988 to 1994-1996. Argentina’s dairy exports to Mercosur countries increased by a factor of 25 during that period, those of Brazil by 160, those of Uruguay by 4, and those of Paraguay by over 22. Total Mercosur intra-trade increased by over 900%. By comparison, total dairy exports to the rest of the world increased by only 50% in the same period (Nofal and Wilkinson 1999, p. 168). It was this combination of national and regional export-friendly policies, and the resulting widening of company’s markets, that made direct infrastructure investments across national borders attractive. As Maximilano Moreno explained: “It was that environment above all which prompted regional expansion  . . . the removal of technical barriers made it a single-level playing field, stimulating companies to expand.”​[37]​ His views are widely shared by other officials as well as policymakers and business experts alike. Two such experts described, for instance, how “the impact of Mercosur on alliances, joint-ventures, mergers and acquisitions has been very significant” (Nofal and Wilkinson 1999, p. 156). They continued:

Mercosur’s impact can be seen at different levels: it has had an effect on market competition for finished products (long life milk, butter), on shaping investment decisions in the powdered milk and cheese sectors, and on prompting a greater level of organization of the actors in the chain. (Nofal and Wilkinson 1999, p. 156)

Because of Mercosur, foreign companies invested heavily in the region, penetrating “the sector through mergers and associations with companies already established in the domestic markets of the member countries” (Nofal and Wilkinson 1999, p. 156; Presidents and Prime Ministers 1997).

Labor Rights
EU laws on labor rights reflect legal and political realities in the member states. The absence of a recognition of the rights to strike and form association is the direct result of relentless opposition from the British, for whom those rights were not enshrined in any legal document (Roberts 2003). A succession of British governments, backed by the Confederation of British Industry, thus opposed any EU initiative. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher “single-handedly blocked the approval” of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers of 1989 (The Economist 1989; Dowdy 1990). Referring to it as a “socialist charter,” (Meade 1989) she asserted that she would not tolerate “attempts by Brussels to impose worker participation and other sensitive issues on Britain” (Xinhua General  News Service 1989). From 2000 on, Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, whether as part of the Treaty of Niece or a European constitution, “should not be legally binding” (Castle 2000). British government officials pointed out that they would work assiduously to ensure “ that the finished product will not create new rights or be in conflict with the law in any member state” (Castle 2000), and that it would ultimately be “subject to national law and practice” (Meade 2000).	
All the EU member states have offered for some time, on the other hand, impressive but also very different unemployment benefits (Gallie and Paugam 2000). The Acting Secretary-General of the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant WorkersACSSMW of the EU has described the member states as offering every possible variant of programs (Coëffard 1982). The range extends from Denmark, where benefits are granted regardless of contributions, to Italy, where benefits are fully determined by contributions. EU law does not seek to harmonize these systems; instead, it intelligently asks member states to extend their current benefits to migrant workers.


TThe transformation of national administrations in the EU -, -- much like that of the other administrations in the other RTAs --, - followed directly from the natureresulted directly fromcan be directly explained in terms of the official demands of  of regionalEU law – demands which, as discussed, did not in any event impose tremendous departures from existing practices. In the case of the EU, Regulation 1408/71 asked that eEach national administration was asked to treat migrant workers as if they were nationals and then, quite naturally, to ensure that its national administrators collaborate at the transnational and national levels by creating the ACSSMW. Along with implementing Regulation 574/72, it also specified the role that  to learn from each other, coordinate their efforts, and so on. nNational administrations tookhad to play to ensure implementation of the key labor principles the necessary steps to comply with those requests.
In the case of NAFTA, all three member states already granted workers the rights to form unions and strike in their national legal systems.​[38]​ With the NAALC, officials simply asked the member states to commit to enforcing existing national legislation. At the same time, they also responded to pressure from powerful trade unions from the United States and Canada, who wished to prevent Mexican employers from enjoying cost advantages derived from illegal abuses of their workers (Phelps 2001, p. 24). President Clinton in particular, in his role as a NAFTA representative, seems to have pushed for the NAALC as a way to address the concerns of the unions (Morton 1993). Clinton, wrote an observer, “hopes to steer a middle ground. He supports the basic concept of NAFTA, but at the same time promises to negotiate side agreements that will mollify the critics” (Hall 1993). It is by contrast clear that the same unions but also national politicians from the United States and Canada would have never supported a NAFTA clause on migrant workers and unemployment.: that would have   
At the organizational level, 
We can then link directly changes in national administrations to tthe NAALC specified explicitly the structure and activities of the Commission for Labor Cooperationprinciples. Administrations participate in transnational organs, and have developed national units, that are designed to implement the NAALC principles. It did the same in the case of NAOs. 
In Mercosur, matters followed a similar course.  As Ruben Cortina, a senior official from Argentina deeply involved in Mercosur’s labor legislation,​[39]​ explained to the author, “the right to strike is very much in the regulatory history of the member states, a history that is shaped by intensive collective bargaining.” Indeed, trade unions made spectacular gains in Argentina and Brazil during the turbulent period of the 1980s. The Confederación General de Trabajadores in Argentina struggled bitterly with the Aflonsín government for a broad sanctioning of the rights to strike and form unions (Cook 2002, p. 6). In 1988 they won those rights. In Brazil, the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores fought successfully to ensure that those same rights be recognized in the new 1988 Constitution (Cook 2002, p. 9). Hence, as Cortina explained, the “Ministries of Labor from the four member states themselves were very active from the very beginning of Mercosur in representing labor’s interests . . . and especially those related to principles such as the right to strike and form unions.”​[40]​ By contrast, the same Mercosur member states have had far more modest unemployment systems, mostly because of Argentina and Uruguay’s histories of very high employment policies and Brazil’s high unemployment problems but lack of resources. Understandably, Mercosur officials thus quite naturally did not consider acting in this area.
The transformation of national labor and employment departments has, again, followed directly the demands of regional law. i Mercosur Resolution 12/2000 spelled out the structure and role of the Social and Labor Commission. Resolution 85/2000, in turn, set up the  nNational administrators have simply taken the required steps to comply with Mercosur law: they have established domestic units to oversee the implementation of Mercosur labor rights and participate in transnational forums to the same end.commissions charged with overseeing the implementation of regional labor rights.


GLOBALIZATION, MARKET BUILDING, AND NEOLIBERALISM

The previous section depicts a world of regions: integration areas characterized by very particular legal and organizational dimensions, each representing an effort to establish transnational markets. In particular, we saw striking differences across the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur in the areas of working women, dairy, and labor rights. This fragmented view of the world challenges current notions of globalization while it confirms theories of economic sociology about market building as a social processes and contributes to a growing literature on the uneven spread of neoliberalism across the globe. 
The most aggressive globalization theories were put forth in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the collapse of Communism as a viable option for organizing human societies (Zakaria 2000). The extensive and sophisticated literature on the topic (Lechner and Boli 2000; O’Meara, Mehlinger and Krain 2000; Berger and Huntington 2002),​[41]​ all points to a decreasing relevance of the local as a place of difference. Two versions of the globalization thesis became especially important. 
The first suggests that the world is becoming an increasingly homogenous place. Observers describe the impending arrival of single models for political, cultural, economic, legal and other types of systems (Fukuyama 1992). Central to their view is the end of variety. In the political realm, for instance, they note that democracy is becoming the only acceptable and sustainable form of governance for any community (Diamond 2000). Market capitalism is instead the only form of economic life, as the examples of the Soviet Union, China, and India show (Arrighi 2000; Burtless et al. 2000). The second version points to the rise of a ‘global village’ where the boundaries of the local are being eroded in favor of global structures of international cooperation. These include the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and other non-governmental entities (World Commission on Environment and Development 2000; Amnesty International 2000).
RTAs, with their unique legal and organizational landscapes, challenge these visions of a global world. They represent enduring heterogeneity. They undermine the idea of convergence, and point us to world where the local still matters and where change occurs, but only gradually and in a manner that ensures continuity with the past. With regard to global cooperation, the existence of distinct RTAs represent either an admission that efforts to forge a global economic system have so far failed or a recognition that societies are not ready to fuse themselves into a single economic system. Either way, RTAs represent smaller, and rather unique, arenas for economic cooperation suggesting, even if indirectly, that the vision of global institutions may either be untenable or still quite far into the future. This articleThis paper thus naturally aligns itself with critics of the globalization thesis, though many sought to ‘rescue’ the ‘national’, rather than the regional, from the ‘global’.​[42]​ 
This articleThis paper confirms the insights of economic sociologists about markets: they are ‘constructed’ in the midst of rich local contexts and variables. Abolafia’s criticism of the neo-classical economic view of markets applies to RTAs. Markets are not “spontaneously generated by the exchange activity of buyers and sellers” (Abolafia, 1996, p. 9) but instead require “rules, roles, and relationships” (Abolafia 1996, p. 9; Spillman 1999; Zelizer 1992) as well as “social structures, social relations, and institutions” (Fligstein 2001, p. 4). All these supporting factors are locally ‘produced’ and, therefore, bound to reflect their specific environments.
Yet, most of the traditional case studies considered by economic sociologists are national-level markets that have formed slowly over time, with the direct and indirect participation of numerous players only on occasion conscious of their contributions (Zelizer 1992). By contrast, RTAs represent deliberate, explicit attempts to create regional markets in very short periods of time. This amounts to a very different kind of market creation: intentional, faster, and programmatic. Fligstein and McNichol (1998) have analyzed market building at the regional level, but only in the context of the EU. This articleThis paper extends that analysis by considering multiple regional efforts. 
Comparative evidence on legal and organizational variation in RTAs addresses a third topic of recent debate: how a particular economic ideology - in this case neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s - has led to remarkably different outcomes in different places, most often because of mediating institutional mechanisms. A number of scholars have noted that policymakers everywhere turned to the free market as the potential solution to economic stagnation and declining standards of living. Initiatives included the deregulation of domestic industries, bureaucratic downsizing, the privatization of state enterprises, the reduction of subsidies, and welfare reforms. The same scholars have then noted  that the pursuit of broadly similar economic principles led to different outcomes (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Guillén 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001a; Schmidt 2002). The following passage from Campbell and Pedersen is representative:

Insofar as labor market institutions are concerned substantial variation remains among the OECD countries in terms of the degree to which they approximate the neoliberal model and, in fact, some clearly do not . . . [there is no] race to lower corporate tax rates . . . nor [is there] a convergence in government subsidies to business . . . this is not to say that convergence is an illusion . . . [there] is evidence for convergence, but with an engaging twist (2001, p. 271).

In a similar passage, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb compare the “the neoliberal transitions” of Chile, Mexico, Britain, and France (2002, p.536) and note “that important differences remain in the way each of these nations came to liberalize its economy” (2002, p. 536). 
To account for national-level differences, Campbell and Pedersen observed that “a variety of historically given factors - many of them institutional, such as formal political institutions and discourse institutions  . . . limited the range of solutions that were either politically available or discursively imaginable to policy makers” (2001, p. 257). Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb explained divergence in terms of the “mediation of national institutions and culture” (2002, p. 536).
The evidence from RTAs confirms these insights, but does so at the regional, rather than national, level. The pursuit of broadly similar economic objectives at the regional level did not happen in identical fashion everywhere, but was instead shaped by local contexts. Neoliberal ideas of free trade represented a starting - rather than finishing - point. They functioned as broad objectives in need of further articulation and practical pursuit.

CAUSALITY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A historical institutional explanation was given to account for the differences across RTAs - one emphasizing continuity with legal and power realities and,ositionreferencesin the member states, and access to resources. Regional market building is a complex process, however. This section discusses additionalthe importance of additional variables shaping the course of RTAs and venues for future research.  


Institutional contexts can explain much, but certainly not all, of the observable variation across RTAs. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the evolution of law and organizations in any given RTAs reflects solely the institutional contexts in which integration takes place. Regional market building is a complex process, and a close analysis of events in the three policy areas considered in this article indicates that other factors influenced the course of events.  Two variables in particular seem especially importantWhat other variables influence regional law and the evolution of organizations?In the case of women, dairy, and labor rights, tTwo variables he first concerns the role of were particularly influential: while the second concernsandCulture and rationality also hold significant explanatory power, at least in the case of women, dairy, and labor rights. Both combined with institutions to shape outcomes across RTAs: specifically, cCulture  heavily shaped some of the institutional environments deemed responsible for variation, while rationality directly shaped the institutions that this article deemed critical for variation, while rational calculations providedd  criticalthe critical link links between certain institutions and outcomes. Interestingly, while c Though often pitted against each other, then, (Lochart 1999), institutions, ultural approaches point us to variables that are a bit more removed from institutions, rationality approaches focus on variables that stand causally closer than institutions to the outcomes of interest. culture, and rationality should be seen as complementary and closely related can thus articlebookfactors shaping the evolution of RTAs. A number of examples illustrate this point.
 Consider the protectionist legal and political legacies surrounding dairy products in Italy, France, and Spain. They belong to broader cultural contexts that celebrate the farming life and food: in all three countries, a close bond between agriculture - and especially small-scale farming - and life has existed for centuries. Legal and political legacies certainly shaped the protectionist character of EU law; yet, the choice of EU officials not to standardize the world of dairy products can only be understood in light of the broader societal values in which EU officials operated. As Henriette Christensen, Secretary General of the powerful European Council of Young Farmers in Brussels, put it, “the bottom line is that for the French and other southern Europeans farming is a way of life … it is less about economics and more about living, being close to the earth.”​[43]​ Similar arguments can probably be made for Canada and its resistance to the liberalization of trade. In South America, by contrast, that heritage was largely missing and governments had felt free to discourage farming in the 1980s and later. The move in the 1990s towards standardization by Mercosur officials was simply welcomed by industry leaders.
The discriminatory national legal traditions against women in the Mercosur member states were also the direct expressions of very conservative and patriarchal cultural contexts.  “We live,” Uruguay’s Beatriz Etchechury Mazza explained to the author, “in male-dominated societies . . . women are only now beginning to really have a voice; Europeans are much ahead of us in this regard; the mentality and values are just not there for us.”​[44]​ The dearth of progressive Mercosur laws on women reflects the endurance of those cultural contexts, which national laws simply embody. The same cultural contexts explain as well the lack of strong women’s organizations at the Mercosur level: the absence of strong national organizations certainly preempted regional organizing, but that domestic situation can only be understood in light of the general position of women in those societies. 
Culture can also help us understand the adamant objections of successive British governments to any EU-level recognition of the rights to form unions and strike. British legislators have hesitated for centuries to codify rights - of any type - into law. This tendency lies at the heart of their common law approach to the regulation of society: a system based on precedent-setting and case-by-case resolutions rather than universal principles established a priori (as in the case of civil law). The British position against the EU concerning labor rights can thus be regarded as fundamentally cultural, though of course it manifested itself mostly as a legal question.
If culture has provided the contexts for the development of national legal and political institutions, the strategic and self-maximizing behavior of key actors has often functioned as the link between those institutions and regional events. Consider, for instance, NAFTA’s recognition of the rights to form unions and strike in the NAALC. Certainly, the NAALC merely stated principles already in place in all three of the member states. Unions from Canada and the United States also pressured officials for a labor document. Yet, ultimately, it was President Bill Clinton who provided much of the impetus behind its creation. Clinton had invested enormous political capital in the success of the project. He was also preparing himself for reelection to a second term. Keenly aware that the adoption of NAFTA without labor support would prove disastrous for his political future, Clinton personally mobilized to see the drafting of the NAALC. “It is widely agreed,” wrote one observer at the time, “that the labor side agreement was included in NAFTA to provide then-U.S. President Bill Clinton with ‘political cover’ to support the deal and mollify his labor union constituency” (MacDonald 2003, p. 181). The NAALC was as much the result of a person’s calculations and deliberation as of institutional realities. 
Self-advancement and calculations also figured prominently in the expansionist behavior of South American dairy companies during the 1990s. The domestic liberalization policies of the 1980s certainly prepared them for international competition. Yet, industry leaders could have reacted quite differently to Mercosur. Expansion represented significant risks, such as exposure to currency fluctuations, drastic changes in market demand, and a turn to domestic favoritism. Indeed, Argentina’s economic and political crisis of 2001 and 2002 threatened the operations of Brazil’s companies in that country. The expansionistic tendencies of those companies, represented “a newly found entrepreneurial spirit, aggressiveness, and an optimism in the promises of Mercosur”, as Maximiliano Moreno, a participant in Mercosur dairy activities and Argentine government official, explained to the author.​[45]​ Matters could have clearly gone quite differently, with industry leaders choosing a more cautious response to integration.
Calculations and interpretations played a role in a number of additional cases. Perhaps a third instructive case was the choice of the major women’s groups from the United States not to mobilize and pressure NAFTA officials, and not to seek transnational links with other women. While that choice was highly consistent with those groups’ historical tendencies not to meddle with international affairs, it also reflected recognition that NAFTA would have a very limited impact of the lives of their members, most of whom were middle and upper-middle class women (Liebowitz 2002, p. 182; MadDonald 2002, p. 162). By contrast, Canadian groups mobilized mostly because they feared NAFTA’s impact on their working class constituents. In turn, Mexican women saw NAFTA quite differently: many viewed it as a job-generating venture, and logically chose to support it.
This articleThis paper was not only limited in its explanatory perspective but also in scope. The door is now open for stimulating and rewarding comparative analyses of RTAs. The empirical focus, for instance, was on only three important policy areas: dairy products, women, and labor rights. These were selected in part because they demonstrate clearly variation in legal and organization developments in the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur. Future studies could select several policy areas and examine patterns of both variation and similarities. 
There is evidence, for example, that officials from different RTAs not only communicate with, but also copy from, each other. As María Juana Rivera from Argentina’s Mininstero de Economía and Producción and a direct participant in Mercosur legislation on products put it, “we very much check on what the EU and others are doing; we use the Internet all the time to keep abreast of developments, and often copy whatever is being done.”​[46]​ EU Directive 88/378 of May 1988 and Mercosur Resolution 54/92 of December 1992 offer an interesting case of replication in the area of product safety for toys. Definitional passages for types of toys and safety hazards are copied verbatim. Normative solutions, in the forms of very detailed safety requirements, are also duplicated. Entire paragraphs are simply reproduced. 

Divergence in law across RTAs raises the question of ‘best practice’. One wonders whether the choice to standardize a given aspect of the world at the regional level is necessary and desirable. What are the advantages of having regional (as opposed to only national) laws on dairy or women, for instance? Are those advantages relevant in all cases of RTAs or only when certain conditions are met?  Moreover, what scale should one use when determining best practices? Efficiency and economic wellbeing could certainly be one yardstick, but tradition and the preservation of culture (as might be the case for dairy) might be another. There are then questions of how to standardize. Any given aspect of the world can be standardized in countless ways, some certainly more desirable than others. Much work must still be done to identify options, guidelines, parameters, and so on. 




 BMI company official: “Farmers are in Germany; we do not want to have to carry milk all the way to France after we collect it in Germany”. FD: “But you could get French milk in France, no?”; BMI: “I guess so”. (July 9, 2002).

Chairman of the Board, Managing Director of Doc Kaas: “Traditionally, we are connected to the source; different coops founded in different cities”. FD: “Does EU law have anything to do with it? Makes it hard to set up shop in Italy, say, b/c of local denominations, etc.”. Chairman: “Yes, I think you are right, though things are changing a little, with companies wanting to become bigger”.
Dairy Crest HR person: “We have a healthy market here in the UK”.






±  = E-mail exchange with company officials. ±  (though other sources provide more precise info)Sent e-mail with request after phone conversation on 7/8/02Maximum of 3 3 (cannot tell if one or all of the 3 actually produce dairy or something else)±  (though other sources provide more precise info)Sent e-mail with request after phone conversation on 7/8/02Unclear (sent e-mail to request info)1 ¥ (with Chairman of the Board, Managing Director) (wish to build a second one, also in NL)0 ¥ (with Chairman of the Board, Managing Director)

¥  = Telephone interview with company officials (July 8-9, 2002) ±sent e-mail to confirm on 7/8/02 ±sent e-mail to confirm on 7/8/02





Abolafia, Mitchel Y. 1996. Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Administrative Commission of the European Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers. 1996. Your Social Security Rights when Moving within the European Union: A Practical Guide. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Amnesty International. 2000. “AI on Human Rights and Labor Rights”, pp. 187-191 in The Globalization Reader, edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Arrighi, Giovanni. “Globalization, State Sovereignty and the ‘Endless’ Accumulation of Capital”, pp. 125-148 in The Ends of Globalization, edited by Don Kalb, Marco Van Der Land, Richard Staring, and Nico Wilterdink. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Atkinson, Glen. 1999. “Developing Global Institutions: Lessons to Be Learned from Regional Integration Experiences.” Journal of Economic Issues 33 (2): 335-341.
Bailey, Kenneth W. 2002. “Comparison of the U.S. and Canadian Dairy Industry.” Staff Paper #349, April. Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University. 
Baldwin, Richard E. 1997. “The Causes of Regionalism.” The World Economy 20 (7): 865-888.
Berger, Peter L. and Huntigton, Samuel P. (editors). 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World.  New York: Oxford University Press.
Bergsten, Fred C. 1996. “24. Globalizing Free Trade.” Foreign Affairs 75 (3): 105-120.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Krueger, Anne O. 1995. The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements. Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1993. “Beyond NAFTA: Clinton’s Trading Choices.” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer): 155-62.
Blum, Jonathan S. 2000. “The FTAA and the Fast Track to Forgetting the Environment: A Comparison of the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR Environmental Models as Examples for the Hemisphere.” Texas International Law Journal (35) 3: 435-457.
Brunke, Henrich. 2002. “Commodity Profile with an Emphasis on International Trade: Dairy Products.” Agricultural Marketing Resource Center (Agricultural Issues Center), University of California at Davies.
Burtless, Gary, et al. 2000. “Globaphobia: Confronting Fears about Open Trade”, pp. 181-186 in The Globalization Reader, edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Cable, Vincent. 1994. “Overview.” Pp.1-16 in Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration, edited by Vincent Cable and David Henderson. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Cameron, David. 1998. “Creating Supranational Authority in Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: The Sources and Effects of EMU.” Pp. 188-216 in European Integration and Supranational Governance, edited by W. Sandholtz and A. S. Sweet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, John L. and Ove K. Pedersen (editors). 2001. The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Carlyle, Elizabeth. 2002. "NAC Attack."  Canadian Dimension 36 (1): 14-16.  
Castle, Stephen. 2000. “New EU Charter Enshrines the ‘Right to Strike.’” The Independent, September 21.
Cavanagh, John, and Sarah Anderson. 2002. “Happily Ever NAFTA? A Bad Idea that Failed.” Foreign Policy September/October (132): 58-60.
Coeffard, Alain. 1982. “Regulations Governing Social Security for Persons Moving within the European Community.” International Labour Review 121 (3): 243-258. 
Commission for Labor Cooperation. 2001. Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation.
Compa, Lance. 2001. “NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement and International Labor Solidarity.” Antipode 33: 451-467.
Connolly, Michelle. 1999. “Mercosur: Implications for Growth in Member Countries.” Current Issues in Economics & Finance 5 (7): 1-5.
Cook, María Lorena. 2002. “Labor Reform and Dual Transitions in Brazil and the Southern Cone.” Latin American Politics & Society 44 (1): 1-34.
Costa, Olivier. 2003. “The European Court of Justice and Democratic Control in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 10 (5): 740-761.
Curtin, Philip D. 1984. Cross-cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, Lance E. and Douglass C. North. 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Roest, Kees and Alberto Menghi. 2000. “Reconsidering 'Traditional' Food: The Case of Parmigiano Reggiano Cheese.” Sociologia Ruralis 40: 439-451.
Diamond, Larry. 2000. “The Globalization of Democracy”, pp. 246-254 in The Globalization Reader, edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1994. “Culture and Economy.” pp. 27-57 in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Domínguez, Edmé R. 2002. “Continental Transnational Activism and Women Workers’ Networks within NAFTA.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 4 (2): 216-239.
Doorne-Huiskes, Jacques Van Hoof and Ellie Roelofs (editors). 1995. Women in the European Labour Markets. London: P. Chapman Publishers.
Douglas, Mary and Wildavski, Aaron. 1983. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Dowdy, Timothy W. 1990. "The Emergence of the Social Dimension of the European Community"  Brigham Young University Law Review 1990 (4): 1667-1686
Doyon, Maurice A. and Andrew M. Novakovic. 1996. “Trade Liberalization and the U.S. and Canadian Dairy Industries.” Paper prepared for the Program on Dairy Markets and Policy, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University.
Duina, Francesco. 1999. Harmonizing Europe: Nation States within the Common Market. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
-----. 2004. “Regional Market Building as a Social Process: An Analysis of Cognitive Strategies in NAFTA, the European Union, and Mercosur,” Economy and Society 33 (3): 359-389.
Duina, Francesco and Paulette Kurzer. 2004. “Smoke in Your Eyes: The Struggle for Tobacco Control in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 11 (1): 57-77.
Echikson, William. 1998. “When Cheese is not Just Cheese: Getting Picky about Origin.” Christian Science Monitor January 22: 1.
Economist. 2002. “The French Exception.” November 16. 
Edelman, Lauren B. and Mark C. Suchman. 1997. “The Legal Environments of Organizations.” Annual Review of Sociology 23 (1): 479-515.
Espino, Maria Alma. 2000.  “Women and Mercosur:  The Gendered Dimension of Economic Integration.”  In UNIFEM, Women’s Empowerment and Economic Justice. New York.
European Commission. 1996. Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in the European Union. Brussels.
European Commission (Director-General for Agriculture, DG VI). 1997. CAP 2000: Situation and Outlook – Dairy Sector. Brussels.
European Women Lawyers Association. 2002. The European Women Lawyers Association. Brussels.
European Women’s Lobby. 2000. Annual Report. Brussels.
Fligstein, Neil. 2001. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-first Century Capitalist Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fligstein, Neil and Alec Stone Sweet. 2002. “Constructing Polities and Markets: An Institutionalist Account of European Integration.” American Journal of Sociology 7:1206-1243.
Fligstein, Neil and Jason McNichol. 1998. “The Institutional Terrain of the European Union,” pp. 59-91 in pp.134-163 in European Integration and Supranational Governance, edited by Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 1997. The Political Economy of the Common Market in Milk and Dairy Products in the European Union. Rome.
Fourcade-Gourinchas, Marion and Sarah L. Babb. 2002. “The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries.” American Journal of Sociology 108 (3): 533-579.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. 1997. Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press.
Gabriel, Christina and Laura Macdonald. 1994. “NAFTA, Women and Organizing in Canada and Mexico: Forging a ‘Feminist Internationality.’” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 23:535-562.
Gallie, Dunca and Serge Paugam (editors). 2000.Welfare Regimes and the Experience of Unemployment in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibb, Richard. 1994. “Regionalism in the World Economy,” Pp. 1-35 in Continental Trading Blocs: The Growth of Regionalism in the World Economy, edited by Richard Gibb and Michalak Wieslaw. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Gordon, Bernard K. 2003. “A High-Risk Trade Policy.” Foreign Affairs, 82 (4): 105-118.
Grieco, Joseph M. 1997. “Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas,” pp. 164-187 in The Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. New York: Columbia University Press.
Griswold, Daniel T. 2003. “NAFTA AT 10: An Economic and Foreign Policy Success,” USA Today, 131 (2696): 22-24. 
Guillén, Mauro F. 2001. The Limits of Convergence: Globalization and Organizational Change in Argentina, South Korea, and Spain. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hall, Carl T. 1993. "New Trade Talks Open Today--U.S. Wants to Boost Mexican Standards in North American Pact."  The San Francisco Chronicle, March 17.
Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice (editors). 2001. Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada). 1997. “Saputo an Even-larger Big Cheese.” Hamilton Spectator, November 11.
Helfand, Steven M. 2000. “Interest Groups and Economic Policy: Explaining the Pattern of Protection in the Brazilian Agricultural Sector.” Contemporary Economic Policy 18 (4): 462-476. 
Henderson, David. 2002. “International Economic integration: Progress, Prospects and Implications.” International Affairs, 68 (4): 633-653.
Higgott, Richard. 1998. “The International Political Economy of Regionalism: The Asia Pacific and Europe Compared,” Pp.42-67 in Regionalism & Global Economic  Integration, edited by William A. Coleman and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill. London and New York: Routledge. 
Hirst, Paul. 2000. “The Global Economy: Myth or Reality?” Pp. 107-123 in The Ends of Globalization, edited by Don Kalb, Marco Van Der Land, Richard Staring, and Nico Wilterdink. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Hormats, Robert D. 1994. “Making Regionalism Safe.” Foreign Affairs 10 (March/April): 97-108.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone.
Imig, Doug and Sidney Tarrow (editors) 2001. Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Inglehart, Ronald, Nevitte, Neil and Basañez, Miguel. 1996. The North American Trajectory: Cultural, Economic, and Political Ties between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. New York : Aldine de Gruyter.
International Monetary Fund. 1994. International Trade Policies: The Uruguay Round and Beyond: Volume II (Background Papers). Washington, D.C.: IMF.
International Monetary Fund. 1995. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995. Washington, D.C. : IMF.
-----.   2000. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2000. Washington, D.C. : IMF.
Jayasuriya, Kainsha. 2003. “Embedded Mercantilism and Open Regionalism: The Crisis of a Regional Political Project.” Third World Quarterly, 24 (2): 199-215.
Jelin, Elizabeth, Valdés, Teresa, and Line Bareiro. 1998. “Gender and Nationhood in Mercosur: Notes for Approaching the Subject.” United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, Discussion Paper No.24.  
Kerremans, Bart and Bob Switky. 2000. “Introduction,” pp.1-9 in The Political Importance of Regional Trading Blocs, edited by Bart Kerremans and Bob Switky. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Knill, Christoph. 2001. The Europeanization of National Administrations: Patterns of Institutional Changes and Persistence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kono, Daniel Yuichi. 2002. “Are Free Trade Areas Good for Multilateralism? Evidence from the European Free Trade Association.” International Studies Quarterly 46 (4): 507-527.
Krueger, Anne O. 1999. “Are Preferential trading arrangements trade Liberalizing or Protectionist?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13( 4): 105-124.
Krugman, Paul. 1993. “The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA,” Foreign Affairs, 72 (5): 13-19.
Lawrence, Robert Z. 1996. Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Lechner, Frank J. and John Boli (editors). 2000. The Globalization Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Liebert, Ulrike. 1999. “Gender Politics in the European Union: The Return of the Public.” European Societies 1 (2): 197-239. 
Liebowitz, Debra J. 2002. “Gendering (Trans)National Advocacy.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 4 (2): 173-196.
Lockhart, Charles. 1999. “Cultural Contributions to Explaining Institutional Form, Political Change, and Rational Decisions.” Comparative Political Studies 32 (7): 862-893.
MacDonald, Ian Thomas. 2003. “NAFTA and the Emergence of Continental Labor Cooperation,” The American Review of Canadian Studies 33 (2): 173-196.
MacDonald, Laura. 2002. “Globalization and Social Movements,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 4 (2): 151-172. 
Malaysia General News. 2002. “AFTA not Affecting Domestic Trade.” Malaysia General News, January 17.
Mattli, Walter. 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mazey, Sonia. 1995.  “The Development of EU Equality Policies: Bureaucratic Expansion on Behalf of Women?” Public Administration 73: 591-609.
Mazey, Sonia. 1998. “The European Union and Women’s Rights: From the Europeanization of National Agendas to the Nationalization of a European Agenda.” Journal of European Public Policy  5:131-52.
-----. 2000. “Introduction: Integrating Gender – Intellectual and ‘Real World’ Mainstreaming.” 2001. Journal of European Public Policy 7: 333-45.
Mazey, Sonia and Jeremy Richardson. 2001. “Interest Groups and EU Policy Making: Organizational Logic and Venue Shopping.” Pp. 217-231in European Union: Power and Policy-Making, edited by J. Richardson, London: Routledge.
McConnell, James and MacPherson, Alan. 1994. “The North American Free Trade Area: An Overview of Issues and Perspectives,” Pp. 163-187 in Continental Trading Blocs: The Growth of Regionalism in the World Economy, edited by Richard Gibb and Michalak Wieslaw. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
McCormick, John. 2001. Environmental Policy in the European Union. Houndmills,  Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave.
Meade, Goeff. 1989. “Pressure Mounting on Thatcher over Social Charter Plan.” Press Association, September 24. 
Mecham, Michael. 2003. “Mercosur: A Failing Development Project?” International Affairs 79 (2): 369-387.
Mény, Yves, Muller, Pierre and Jean-Louis Quermonne (editors). 1996. Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies. London and New York: Routledge.
Michalak, Wieslaw. 1994. “The political Economy of Trading Blocs,” Pp. 37-72 in Continental Trading Blocs: The Growth of Regionalism in the World Economy, edited by Richard Gibb and Michalak Wieslaw. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Milner, Helen. 1997. “Industries, Governments, and Regional Trade Blocs,” pp. 77-106 in The Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner. New York: Columbia University Press.
Milner, Helen. 1998. “Regional Economic C-operation, Global Markets and Domestic Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty,” pp. 19-41 in Regionalism & Global Economic Integration, edited by William A. Coleman and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill. London and New York: Routledge.
Milward, Alan. 1992. The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Morton, Peter. 1993. “Talks Set for Next Month on ‘Parallel’ NAFTA Deals.” The Financial Post  (Toronto), February 18.
Navarro, Marysa. 2001. “Argentina: The Long Road to Women’s Rights,” pp.1-14 in Women’s Rights: A Global View, edited by Lynne Walter. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Nofal, María Beatriz and Wilkinson, John. 1999. “Production and Trade in Dairy Products in Mercosur.” Integration & Trade Journal 78 (January-August): 147-169.
O’Meara, Patrick, Mehlinger, Howartd D. and Krain, Matthew (editors). 2000. Globalization and the Challenges of the New Century. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1993. “The Rise of the Region-State.” Foreign Affairs, 72 (2): 78:87.
Ostner, Ilona and Jane Lewis. 1995. “Gender and the Evolution of European Social Policies,” pp. 159-193 in European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration, edited by Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Outshoorn, Joyce and Joke Swiebel. 2001. “Feminism and the State in the Netherlands.” Pp. 143-165 in Women’s Movements and Public Policy in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by G. L. à Nijeholt, V. Vargas and S. Wieringa. New York and London: Garland Publishing.
Panagariya, Arvind. 2000. Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments.” Journal of Economic Literature (38) 2: 287: 331.
Patroni, Viviana. 1998. "The Politics of Labour Legislation Reform in Mexico."  Capital & Class 65: 107-132.
Phelps, Constance. 2001. “Social Work and Labor: A Look at the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare XXVIII (1): 23-41.
Pierson, Paul. (2000) “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” American Political Science Review (94) 2: 251-267. 
Pitanguy, Jacqueline. 1998. “The Women’s Movement and Public Policy in Brazil.”Pp. 97-112 in Women’s Movements and Public Policy in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by G. L. à Nijeholt, V. Vargas and S. Wieringa. New York and London: Garland Publishing.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.
Pollack, Mark A. and Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2001. “Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 7:432-56.
Presidents & Prime Ministers. 1997. “Dairy Sector.” Presidents & Prime Ministers 6 (3): 22-27.
Ramirez, Miguel D. 2003. “Mexico Under NAFTA: A Critical Assessment,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 863-892.
Reuveny, Rafael and William R. Thompson. 2000. “Trade, Regionalization, and Tariffs: The Correlates of Openness in the American Long Run,” pp. 55-83 in The Political Importance of Regional Trading Blocs, edited by Bart Kerremans and Bob Switky. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Richards, Donald G. 1999. “Dependent Development and Regional Integration: A Critical Examination of the Southern Cone Common Market.” Latin American Perspectives 24 (6) 133-155.
Roberts, Bob. 2003. “Strike Out the Rights: Britain to Bloc EU bid for All-out Action.” The Mirror, May 28.
Rossilli, Mariagrazia. 1999. "The European Union's Policy on the Equality of Women."   Feminist Studies 25 (1): 168-182.
Salinas, Carlos de Gortari. 1995. “The More Trade Blocs The Better.” New Perspectives Quarterly (12) 1: 38-39.
Scollay, Robert. 2001. “The Changing Outlook for Asia-Pacific Regionalism.” World Economy 24 (9):  1135-1160.
Serra, Jaime and Espinosa, Enrique J. 2002. “Happily Ever NAFTA? The Proof Is in the Paycheck. Foreign Policy September/October (132): 132-134.
Skjaerseth, Jon Birger and Wettestad, Jorgen. 2002. “Understanding the Effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy: How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?” Environmental Politics 11 (3): 99-120.
Spanish Newswire Services. 1999. “Lacteos Argentinos Deberan Demostrar Cumplimento Sanitario.” September 15. 
Spanish Newswire Services. 2000. “Mercosur No Desistirá de Lucha Contra Proteccionismo Agricola UE.’ February 23. 
Sperling, Liz and Charlotte Bretherton. 1996. “Women’s Policy Networks and the European Union.” Women’s studies International Forum 19:303-14.
Spillman, Lyn. 1999. “Enriching Exchange: Cultural Dimensions of Markets.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology (58) 4: 1047-1073.
Stetson, Dorothy McBride. 1997. Women's Rights in the U.S.A.: Policy Debates and Gender Roles. New York: Garland Publishing.
Stubbs, Richard. 2000. Signing on to Liberalization: AFTA and the Politics of Regional Economic Cooperation.” Pacific Review 13 (2): 297-318.
Summers, Larry. 1991. “Regionalism and the World Trading System,” Pp.11-21 in Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones, edited by Larry Summers. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Swenarchuk, Michelle, Ritchie, Laurell, Vosko, Leah F., and Cohen, Marjorie Griffin. 2002. "Globalization: Some Implications and Strategies for Women."  Canadian Woman Studies, June.
Taccone, Juan José, and Luis Jorge Garay (editors). 1999. Impacto Sectorial de la Integración en el Mercosur.  Buenos Aires, Banco Interamericano de Desarollo & Instituto para la Integración de América Latin y el Caribe (INTAL).
Taylor, Rupert J. 1997. “Labour History: The Struggle for Workers' Rights.” Canada and the World Backgrounder 63 (3): 1-50. 
Thapanachai, Somporn. 1999. “Looking Ahead --- 2000 ASEAN Trade: AFTA an Apprenticeship for Liberalizing under the WTO.” Bangkok Post, December 22.
Thatcher, Margaret. 1998. “A Family of Nations”, pp. 49-54 in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, edited by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
The Ecologist. 2002. “NAFTA - Placing Investors' Rights Before the Environment.” The Ecologist 32 (7): 16.
The Economist. 1975. "Social Affairs: Getting Warmer."  The Economist, December 27.
The Economist. 1989. “The EEC’s Social Dimension: Louder than Words,” The Economist, July 8: 38.
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 369-4040.
Thurow, Lester. 1992. “New Rules for Playing the Game.” National Forum (72) 4: 10-12.
Torfing, Jacob. 2001. “Path-dependent Danish Welfare Reforms: The Contributions of the New Institutionalism to Understanding Evolutionary Change,’ Scandinavian Political Studies 24 (4): 277-309.
Ulshoefer, Petra. 1998. Mercosur and the Challenges for the Integration and Participation of Women in the World of Work. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
Walter, Lynn. 2001. “Denmark: Women’s Rights and Women’s Welfare”Pp. 57-70 in Women’s Rights: A Global View, edited by W. Lynne. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Warner, Herriet. 1984. “EC Social Policy in Practice: Community Action on Behalf of Women and its Impact in the Member States,” Journal of Common Market Studies 23: 141-167.
White, Marceline, Salas Carlos, and Sarah Gammage. 2003. Trade Impact Review: Mexico Case Study – NAFTA and the FTAA: A Gender Analysis of Employment and Poverty Impacts in Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: Women’s Edge Coalition. 
Women’s International Network News. 1996. “Canada.” Women’s International Network News (22) 2: 20.
Women’s International Network News. 2003. “Mexico: Legislation Passed to Protect Women’s Rights.” Women’s International Network News (29) 3: 63.
World Commission on Environment and Development. 2000. “From One Earth to One World”, pp. 374-379 in The Globalization Reader, edited by Frank J. Lechner and John Boli. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Xinhua General News Service. 1989. “Britain’s Labor Party Favors EC Social Charter.” Xinhua General News Service, October 4.
Yeung, May T., Perdikis, Nicholas and William A. Kerr (editors). 1999. Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy: The EU and ASEAN. Chelentham, United Kingdom and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Zakaria, Fareed. 2000. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Pp.181-195 in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, edited by Partick O’Meara, Howard Mehlinger and Matthew Krain. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Zelizer, Vivana A. 1992. "Human Values and the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death in 19th Century America." pp. 285-304 in The Sociology of Economic Life, edited by Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg. Boulder: Westview Press.
Zuniga, Gloria. 1999. “An Ontology of Economic Objects: An Application of Carl Menger's Ideas.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58 (2): 299-312.


































^1	  I am grateful to over thirty officials and industry representatives from Europe, North America, and South America for interviews in person, over the telephone, or through electronic mail during 2002-2004. I benefited especially from onsite conversations with Ruben Cortina, Maximiliano Moreno, and María Juana Rivera (from Argentina’s government), Maricela Viera and Beatriz Etchechury Mazza (from Uruguay’s government), Manuel Olarreanga (Mercosur’s Secretariat), Cécile Greboval (European Women’s Lobby), Mauro Poinelli (Coldiretti in Brussels), Henriette Christensen (Secretary General of the European Council of Young Farmers in Brussels), and Pierluigi Londero (European Commission). A tTelephone conversationinterviews with an anonymous lawyer from the United States Trade Representative Office and with David Phillips (Chief Editor of Dairy Foods Magazine) about NAFTA wereas also particularly helpful.  
^2	  On these topics, there has been a deluge of writings. Some representative works would include Costa (2003), Duina and Kurzer (2004), Knill (2001), Moravcsik (1998), Thatcher (1998), and Zweifel (2002).
^3	  See for instance Polanyi (1944), who, as DiMaggio notes (1994, p. , p. 36), argued that land and labor had to become labeled as commodities in Europe before a genuine capitalist market could flourish. Davis and North (1971) have argued that capitalist markets can only emerge when notions of private property are present. More recently, Douglas and Wildavski (1983) have noted that shared agreements over the nature of risk had to precede the birth of the insurance industry. Zelizer (1992) has argued that life insurance could only exist when certain understandings of death and family responsibility came about.   An See Spillman (1999) for an initial general theoretical formulation of shared understandings of reality in economic life by Spillman (1999) generates interesting ideas.. 
^4	  Cross-cultural trade has created problems throughout history well before the formation of RTAs. The preferred solutions in the past was the use of emissaries who, after years of residence in a foreign culture, could act as trusted interpreters for the participants in the exchange (see Curtin 1984, p. 2).
^5	  Much has been written on the general topic of how law influences organizations in society. This article sides with those scholars who view law as ‘generating’ organizational changes, rather than law as obstructing and constraining organizational behavior. See Edelman and Suchman (1997) for a conceptual overview of key approaches. 
^6	 
^7	  Launched with the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) of 1957 and subsequent revisions and additions. The EU has in fact three ‘pillars’: the common market itself, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA). This article concerns only the common market.
^8	  Estimates for NAFTA and Mercosur are calculated from data available in International Monetary Fund (1995, 2000).
^9	  	Several keywords were used.  Examples include: “work”, “worker”, ‘“florawomen” and “fauna’”, ‘cheese’, ‘dairy, and  ‘“honeylabor rights’”, “environment”, “employee”, “workplace”, “working women”, and “bees”..
^10	  Note that plants located beyond national boundaries are not considered part of a company’s transnational network if 95% or more of their products are imported for domestic consumption.
^11	  The EU has more recently adopted two additional approaches to gender equality with only limited impact on legislative production for the workplace: ‘positive action programs’ and ‘mainstreaming’.  The former includes practical initiatives to advance those equality concepts already found in the law (Mazey 1998, p.141). The latter approach is an attempt to ensure that women’s issues and female representatives are shaping policymaking in a variety of areas, including the workplace (European Commission 1996, Chapter 5).
^12	  To date, a total of over 600 products (dairy and other types) enjoy special denomination status (European Report 2003). For exact figures on cheeses, see the EU’s Internet site: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/qual/en/1bbab_en.htm.
^13	  For milk, laws target drinking milk (Regulation 2597/97), partly or wholly dehydrated milk (Directive 2001/114), and production hygienic measures (Directive 89/362). For milk derivatives, laws target butter (Regulation 577/97) and use of caseins and caseinates in cheeses (Directive 2204/90).
^14	  Dairy Crest has a cheese manufacturing plant on the coast of Ireland. However, 98% of its products are intended for the British market (telephone interview with Company Official, July 2002). As discussed in the methods section, such a plant is not categorized as part of a transnational production infrastructure.
^15	  For this study, data was also collected for companies in The Netherlands and Denmark, given the presence of Dutch and Danish companies in Germany and Great Britain. The three largest companies in the Netherlands (Friesland, Campina and Nestlé) had international presence in other member states, making the Netherlands somewhat similar to France; only one company in Denmark (Arla), however, had international productive capacity. Irish, Spanish and Italian companies are known to have little production capabilities in other EU member states. 
^16	  E-mail exchange with cCompany oOfficials, April 2004. Data on the timing of Danone’s expansion is not available. 
^17	  Telephone iInterview with cCompany oOfficial, March 2004.
^18	  The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers of 1989 did include the right to strike but was only a ‘solemn commitment’ by the member states to a set of fundamental rights. 
^19	  For instance, in Canada strikes are prohibited during the term of a collective bargaining agreement, in Mexico workers may be forced to return to work or lose their jobs if certain legal requirements are not fulfilled, and in the United States employers are allowed to replace striking workers permanently.
^20	  See, for instance, the 1996 informational guide (ACSSMW 1996, Section 5.8), Decision 96/172/EC, and Recommendation No.21 of 28 November 1996.
^21	  In Stockholm, a major office is Arbetsformedlingen City.terview with the author, Brussels, April 2004.
^22	  Interview with the author, Brussels, Belgium, April 2004. 
^23	  In the United States, women have made major progress in social and personal issues (abortion, divorce, etc.) but more limited progress in workplace issues (See Stetson 1997(1997). An Equal Rights Amendment with significant workplace clauses, passed by the Senate in 1972, could not get ratified by 38 or more states and thus failed. Canadian women have probably obtained the most advanced legislative principles on economic rights, with the passing in the late 1970s of an impressive federal plan (, WWomen’s International Network News (1996), ; Gabriel and Macdonald (1994: 540). Mexico’s constitution and labor law provide for ‘equal pay for equal work in equal jobs’, a limited principle which was eventually broadened in 2003 with the passage of a more comprehensive law on women’s rights (W, and Women’s International Network News (2003).
^24	  Assessor in Uruguay’s Instituto Nacional de la Familia y de la Mujer, Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura.
^25	   Interview with the author, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 2003.
^26	   Interview with the author, Brussels, Belgium, April 2004.
^27	   These were Fontina, Grana Padano, Pecorino Siciliano, and Parmigiano Reggiano.
^28	   See Decree 93-1239 of 15 November 1993 for a list of cheeses.
^29	  Interview with the author, Brussels, Belgium, April 2002. 
^30	  The figure comes from Londero’s database. Note that it refers to the 12 member states that the EU had in 1990 (i.e., not Finland, Sweden, and Austria  ---- countries with little weight in this sector). Figures for the EU 15 for 1996-2002 point to an increase in intra-regional trade of about 20%. 
^31	  Telephone iInterview with company official, July 2002
^32	  Telephone iInterview with company official, July 2002.
^33	  Telephone iInterview with company official, February 2004.
^34	  Telephone iInterview, February 2004.
^35	  Legal Advisor in the Argentina’s Ministerio de Economía and Producción, Coordinación de Legislación Internacional, Dirección Nacional de Mercados Agroalimentarios (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos). 
^36	  Interview with the author, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2003.
^37	  Interview with the aAuthor, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2003. 
^38	  For Canada, see the Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967 and the Canada Labor Code of 1971 (Taylor 1997). For Mexico, see Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917 and the 1931 Ley Federal de Trabajo (Patroni 1998). For the United States, see the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.For a comparative analysis of the right to strike in the United States and Canada, especially as it applies  to public sector employees, see McGuire (1987). On some of the limitations concerning Mexico, see Diebel (1993). 
^39	  Coordinator of International Affairs at Argentina’s Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social andand  member of  Mercosur’s Subgrupo No.10 (Work, Employment and Social Security) and of the nNational cCommission (for the implementation of Mercosur’s Social and Labor Declaration).
^40	  Interview with the author, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2003. 
^41	  For an excellent review, see Guillén (2001).
^42	  There are by now many interesting examples. In a representative work, for instance, J. Glenn (2001) showed that the embrace of democracy at end of Communism across the world ushered a new wave oThose few who emphasize the regional include Ohmae (1993), Hirst (2000), and Huntington (1997).f superficially similar, but in fact quite different, democratic regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. See also Paul, Ikenberry, and Hall (2003), Weiss (2003), and Solinger, Smith, and Topik (1999).
^43	  Interview with the author, Brussels, Belgium, April 2004.
^44	  Interview with the author, Montevideo, Uruguay, August 2003. 
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